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PUBLIC HEALTH FUNDS: THE NEXT STEP IN THE 
EVOLUTION OF TORT LAW 
Ann Taylor* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Each year, in our country, 700,000 persons contract cancer.1 Scien-
tists estimate that seventy to ninety percent of those persons are 
victims of toxic exposure.2 Human exposure to toxic substances re-
sults from the commonplace usage of untested toxic chemicals,3 the 
high percentage of improper disposals,4 chemical accidents,5 and sud-
den uncontrolled releases.6 This mass proliferation of human exposure 
and resulting harm has led to the creation of the field of toxic torts.7 
Toxic torts have several unique characteristics-the long latency 
and the scientific uncertainty of exposure related diseases-which 
have created a number of insurmountable legal and practical barriers 
to recovery.8 These barriers include statutes of limitations, the single 
* Clinical Placement Director, 1993-1994, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW 
REVIEW. 
1 See Allan Kanner, Issues in Toxic Litigation, C757 ALI-ABA 247 (1992) (citing R. WINTER, 
CANCER-CAUSING AGENTS 1-2 (1979)). 
2Id. 
3 More than 65,000 chemicals are untested concerning their effects on the environment or 
human health. Leslie S. Gara, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using Common Sense and the 
Common Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental Hazards, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 265, 265 (1988). 
4 The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works found that more than 90% of all 
hazardous chemical wastes produced in the United States are disposed of improperly. Ayers v. 
Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 298 (N.J. 1987) (citing S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
3 (1980) (citing EPA estimates)). 
5 Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws To Pro-
duce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1800-01 (1989). 
6Id. 
7 Amy B. Blumenberg, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of Future Medical 
Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 661 (1992). 
8 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 667, 672; Allen T. Slagel, Medical Surveillance Damages: A 
Solution to the Inadequate Compensation of Toxic Tort Victims, 63 IND. L.J. 849, 851-52 (1988). 
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cause of action rule, and proof of causation.9 Government action has 
done little to eradicate these barriers.lO As a result, the basic purposes 
of tort law---compensation of victims of wrongful conduct and deter-
rence of future tortious conduct-are frustratedY 
In response, traditional tort principles have been adapted and courts 
have recognized several innovative damage theories.12 These theories 
include fear of future illness, enhanced risk of future illness, medical 
monitoring damages,13 and the public health fund. 14 The most success-
ful innovative damage theory is medical monitoring damages founded 
on legal, medical, and public policy principles.15 The public health fund 
is an adaptation of medical monitoring damages, which has recently 
been considered by several jurisdictions and utilized successfully in 
private settlement actions.16 A public health fund is a fund that stud-
ies, develops, and distributes scientific data on the effects of toxic 
exposure on humans.17 
This Comment addresses the adaptability of tort law, its past evo-
lution, and its necessary future evolution. Section II of this Comment 
examines the unique characteristics of toxic torts-the long latency18 
9 See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 669, 671-72; Slagel, supra note 8, at 853--55; David G. 
Poston, Goue Today and Here Tomorraw: Damage Recovery for Subsequent Develaping Latent 
Diseases in Toxic Tort Exposure Actious, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 159, 161-68 (1990). 
10 Legislative action has failed to provide a viable means of recovery for toxic tort victims. 
See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 675-76; Slagel, supra note 8, at 857. 
11 See PROSSER AND KEETON, ON THE LAW OF 'IbRTS § 4 at 25 (5th ed. 1984); Slagel, supra 
note 8, at 856--57; Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 
1630-31 (1986) [hereinafter Develapments in the Law]. 
12 Slagel, supra note 8, at 858-59; MICHAEL DORE, LAW OF 'IbXIC TORTS: LITIGATION/DE-
FENSE/INSURANCE § 7.01 at 7-2 (1987); D. Alan Rudlin & Lindsey W. Stravitz, Innovative 
Remedies and Damages Theories, 446 PLIILIT 73, 73 PLI Order No. H4-5144 (Oct.-Nov. 1992). 
13 Slagel, supra note 8, at 858-59; DORE, supra note 12, § 7.01 at 7-2. Less commonly asserted 
theories are impaired quality of life and loss-of-chance. Slagel, supra note 8, at 859. 
14 See, e.g., Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 778 F. Supp. 512, 514-15 (D. Colo. 1991) (district court 
recognized claim for creation of fund designed to gather and distribute scientific data on the 
health of exposed plaintiffs); Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 673 F. Supp. 1466, 1468, 
1478 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (district court recognized plaintiff's claim for the creation of a fund which 
would gather and distribute scientific evidence on exposure-related diseases). 
15 See Slagel, supra note 8, at 858, 862. 
16 See, e.g., Cook, 778 F. Supp. at 515 (district court stated that public health fund is comple-
ment and consistent with public policy principles of medical monitoring damages); Barth, 673 F. 
SUpp. at 1476, 1478 (district court recognized plaintiff's claim for the creation of public health 
fund); In re Three Mile Island Litig., 557 F. SUpp. 96, 97 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (public health fund 
designed to "finance studies of the long term health effects of the TMI incident ... "). 
17 See, e.g., Cook, 778 F. Supp. at 514-15 (plaintiffs sought public health fund that gathered 
and distributed scientific data on exposed class); Barth, 673 F. SUpp. at 1476 (public health fund 
was a fund to develop general scientific data on diagnosis and diseases related to benzene 
exposure); In re Three Mile Island, 557 F. Supp. at 97 (public health fund designed to finance 
specific and general health studies). 
18 See infra notes 53--56 and accompanying text. 
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and scientific uncertainty of exposure-related diseases.19 Section II 
also reviews traditional tort doctrines which virtually prohibit recov-
ery in toxic tort cases20-the statute of limitations,21 the single contro-
versy rule,22 and standards of causation.23 Section III examines the 
early innovative damage theories developed to accommodate toxic 
torts24-fear of future illness25 and enhanced risk of illness.26 Then this 
Section examines the most successful innovative theory, medical mon-
itoring damages, including its legal, medical, and public policy foun-
dations.27 Finally, Section III considers public health funds, a new 
theory of damages that has been considered in a few courts and very 
successfully implemented in private settlement actions.28 Section IV 
concludes that the essential next step in the evolution of tort law is 
the recognition of public health fund damages.29 Public health funds 
are necessary to reincorporate compensation and deterrence into tort 
law.30 
II. ToXIC ToRT RECOVERY IS SEVERELY HINDERED UNDER 
TRADITIONAL ToRT DOCTRINE 
Ordinary cleaning supplies, such as disinfectants, bleach, fabric 
softeners, spot removers, and polishes, all contain hazardous ingredi-
ents.31 Chemicals and hazardous substances32 are commonplace in 
every sector of our economy and in every home in the United States.33 
In 1983, The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
19 See infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 7~1 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 82-108 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text. 
2ll See infra notes 120-43 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 189-205 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 206-27 and accompanying text. 
'l:l See infra notes 232~16 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 317-76 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 377-443 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra section V. 
31 Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1801 n.11 (citing M. GREENBERG & R. ANDERSON, HAZARDOUS 
WASTE SITES 4 (1984». 
32 "Toxic substances are any chemical, biological, biochemical or radioactive materials that 
cause an immediate or long-term harm to people, animals or the environment. Examples of toxic 
substances include: Asbestos, Agent Orange, Benzene, Diethyestibestrol (DES), Dioxin, For-
maldehyde, Radiation, and Vinyl Chloride." Slagel, supra note 8, at 849 n.1; see also, David 
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the 
Tart System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 851 n.2 (1984). 
33 See In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litig. v. Monsanto Co., 916 F.2d 829, 850 n.22 (3d Cir. 
1990), cm. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991); Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 661-S2; Develapments 
in the Law, supra note 11, at 1462; Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1800"'{)1. 
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estimated that over 575,000 chemical products existed and were util-
ized, in this country.34 Additionally, 1,000 new hazardous chemicals are 
developed and distributed each year.35 Of these, more than 65,000 
chemicals are untested concerning their effects on the environment 
or human health.36 In 1978, the United States produced 320 billion 
pounds of synthetic organic chemicals.37 The Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works found that more than ninety percent 
of all hazardous chemical wastes produced in the United States were 
disposed of improperly.38 
This massive, commonplace use of untested toxic chemicals,39 in 
conjunction with the extremely high percentage of improper dis-
posal,40 chemical accidents,41 and "sudden uncontrolled releases"42 has 
resulted in the emergence of a new field of law-toxic tortS.43 Toxic 
torts are the legal actions arising when a person is exposed to toxic 
substances and harm results.44 
A. The Unique Nature of Toxic Torts 
Traditional tort law compensates people who are injured by the 
wrongful conduct of others.4fi For example, if a defendant runs a stop 
sign, hits the plaintiff's car, and causes the plaintiff injury, such as a 
34 Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1801 n.10 (1989) (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 53,323 (1983». 
36 MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL ToXIC EXPOSURE 3 (1988). 
36 Gara, supra note 3, at 265. Other statistics indicate that 80% of the 48,000 chemical sub-
stances in general commercial use have no available data as to toxicity. See Lyndon, supra note 
5, at 1803 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ToXICITY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETER-
MINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES 14 (1984». Toxicity is the science of poisons and their effects. 2 
AMERICAN LAW INST. REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL 
INJURY 321 (1991) [hereinafter 2 AMERICAN LAW INST.]. The National Research Council 
estimated that adequate information to make an accurate risk assessment is available in only 
10% of pesticides, 2% of cosmetic ingredients, 5% of food additives, and 18% of drug ingredients. 
Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1803 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNClL, ToXICITY TESTING: 
STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES 12 (1984». 
37 This was an increase from 1.3 billion pounds in 1940. Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1799 n.9 (citing 
R. NADER ET AL., WHO'S POISONING AMERICA 5 (1981». 
38 See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 298 (N.J. 1987) (citing S. REP. No. 848, 96th 
Cong.,2d Sess. 3 (1980) (citing EPA estimates»; see also Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 661 n.1. 
39 Gara, supra note 3, at 265. 
40 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 298 (citing S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980) (citing EPA 
estimates». 
41 Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1800"'{)1. 
42Id. 
43 See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 661. 
44 See Jane E. Lovell et. al., Innovative Remedies and Damages Thearies, 446 PLIILIT 129, 
129 PLI Order No. H4-;5144 (Oct.-Nov. 1992); Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 661 n.2. 
46 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 2 at 6. 
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broken leg, the plaintiff may bring a negligence tort action against the 
defendant. If the plaintiff can prove that: the defendant had a duty or 
obligation to conform to a specified standard of conduct; the defendant 
failed to conform to that required duty or standard; there existed a 
reasonably close causal connection between the defendant's conduct 
and the resulting injury; and an actual loss or damage resulted, the 
defendant must compensate the plaintiff for the resulting injury.46 
Toxic torts actions, by analogy, seek to compensate persons exposed 
to hazardous substances who suffer an injury due to the conduct of 
anotherY Four theories of recovery are utilized by toxic tort victims: 
negligence, nuisance, strict liability, and trespass.48 The most com-
monly used is negligence.49 To prove negligence the plaintiff must 
show that the defendant was under a duty to conform to a standard 
of conduct; that the defendant breached that standard; that there was 
a reasonably close connection between the conduct and the resulting 
injury; and that the plaintiff suffered an actual 10ss.50 Toxic torts, 
however, have unique characteristics which frustrate recovery under 
these traditional tort remedies.51 
Toxic torts have two unique characteristics which distinguish them 
from traditional tort cases-the long latency and scientific uncer-
tainty of exposure-related diseases.52 These characteristics create vir-
tually insurmountable legal and practical barriers to recovery for 
victims of toxic exposure. Prior to examining the legal and practical 
barriers to recovery, a brief explanation of the unique characteristics 
of toxic torts is necessary. 
Injuries or illness resulting from toxic exposure are often latent-
undetectable for a period of time after exposure.53 While a broken leg 
46 Id. § 30 at 1644i5. 
47Id. § 2 at 6. 
48 See Strand, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The 
Example of Thxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 581 (1983); 
Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 671-72. Some toxic tort plaintiffs have utilized warranty, fraud, 
and deceit, as additional causes of action. L. Grant Foster, A Case Study in Thxic Tort Causa-
tion: Scientific and Legal Standards Work Against Recovery for Victims, 19 ENVTL. L. 141, 
145--46 (1988). 
49 Ayers v. 'lbwnship of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 300-4>1 (N.J. 1987); see also Developments in 
the Law, supra note 11, at 1610-11; Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 672; Foster, supra note 48, at 
146. 
50 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 30 at 1644i5. See also Ayers, 525 A.2d at 301. 
51 Ayers, 525 A.2d at 299; see also William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liability 
for Thxic Thrts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 920-28 (1981); Rosenberg, supra 
note 32, at 855-59; Strand, supra note 48, at 578-80; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, 
at 1602-4>5. 
52 See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 667. 
53 The latency period is the interval between a person's exposure to the toxic substance 
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may be diagnosed immediately, toxic exposure injuries, such as can-
cer,54 may remain undetected for decades.55 Even when the toxic ex-
posure causes a present injury, additional latent injuries often remain 
undetected.56 
The scientific uncertainty of cancer and other exposure-related 
diseases57 stems from two sources: the complex etiology of the dis-
eases58 and the insufficiency of scientific data on toxic exposure and 
its effect on humans.59 Cancer and exposure-related diseases have 
highly ambiguous etiology,60 making it extremely difficult to identify 
which factor or factors, contributed to a particular disease.61 For 
example, the disease of lung cancer has been attributed to asbestos 
exposure,62 tobacco inhalation,63 and ionizing radiation.64 Additionally, 
responsible for the manifestation of a disease and the first signs of the disease by definitive 
symptoms or actual detection. See Slagel, supra note 8, at 852 n.11 (citing F. HOMBURGER ET 
AL., A GUIDE TO GENERAL ToXICOLOGY 203 (1983»; Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 668 n.32 
(citing Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating 
Cause-In-Fact, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 429, 429 n.2 (1983». 
54 Cancer is the most common injury caused by toxic exposure. Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1801 
& n.16 (a high percentage of cancers are thought to be caused by environmental factors) (citing 
NATIONAL ToXICOLOGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PUBLIC HEALTH 
SERV., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS 5 (1985». In 1983, 440,000 Americans died 
of cancer. Id. Scientists estimate that 70 to 90% of the new 700,000 cases of cancer each year, 
are caused by toxic exposure. See Kanner, supra note 1, (citing R. WINTER, CANCER-CAUSING 
AGENTS 1-2 (1979». 
55 The average latency periods for toxic substances are as follows: "arsenic, 25 years; tar, 20-24 
years; radiation, 20-30 years; asbestos, 18 years; chromates, 15 years." See Slagel, supra note 
8, at 859 n.15 (citing 5B LAWYERS MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED 
SPECIALTIES § 38 (3d ed. 1986». 
56 Sometimes toxic exposure results in immediately detectable injuries. Such effects usually 
"occur shortly after high-level exposure and range in severity from temporary rashes to death." 
See Jeffrey 'l'rauberman, Statutory Reform of "7bxic 7brts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and 
Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 180 (1983). 
57 "Dermatological injury, gastrointestinal disease, heart disease, respiratory illnesses, and 
musculoskeletal disorders," are some of the exposure-related diseases. Blumenberg, supra note 
7, at 663 n.10 (1992). 
58 See Develapments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1618; Slagel, supra note 8, at 852. 
59 Slagel, supra note 8, at 852. 
60 See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1603. Etiology is the study of the causes of 
diseases. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 542 (25th ed. 1990). 
61 When an exposure-related injury is discovered it is rarely attributable to a single toxic 
substance. See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1618 (quoting David Rosenberg, The 
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the 7brt System, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 851, 856 (1984) ("[rlarely is any particular toxic agent the exclusive source of a 
given disease.''». See also Slagel, supra note 8, at 853; 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 36, 
at 327. 
62 See Janis L. Kirkland, What's Current in Asbestos Regulations, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 375, 
376 (1989). 
63 See the required warning on any package of cigarettes. 
64 See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 301 (N.J. 1987). 
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the causes of many diseases have not yet been determined65 or have 
been linked to many contributing factors.66 
Scientific data concerning cancer and exposure-related diseases is, to 
date, unavailable or inconclusive.67 This lack of knowledge stems from 
several factors. First, medical ethics prohibits the testing of products 
on humans, therefore minimal pre-production data exists.68 Second, 
manufacturers of toxic substances have a disincentive to develop and 
distribute data.69 Scientific data collection is extremely expensive,70 
and businesses prefer to spend their funds on new research.71 Further, 
if a manufacturer produces data, discovers an increased risk of dis-
ease, and distributes that information, the manufacturer loses the cost 
of the research and the profits from the product.72 Third, scientific data 
on cancer and other exposure-related diseases has been unable to "keep 
pace" with the use of toxic substances.73 The majority of scientific data 
on exposure-related diseases cannot be compiled until the manifesta-
tion of a disease.74 This compilation process is hindered by under-re-
porting of toxic exposure and the limited early identification of vic-
65 See Foster, supra note 48, at 144. For example, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), 
commonly known as Lou Gehrig's disease, has been diagnosed, but to date, no cause or cure has 
been scientifically determined. Id. 
66 Wendy E. Wagner, Trans-Science in Torts, 96 YALE L.J. 428, 430 n.13 (1986). Cancer, which 
is linked to toxic-exposure, may also occur in the absence of toxic substances. See Strand, supra 
note 48, at 584 n.31. 
67 See Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1803--{)4. The National Research Council concluded its report 
on testing of toxic substances by stating "[i]n view of the great importance of exposure data 
and indices of hazardous assessment and the nearly complete absence of such data, the commit-
tees recommend that planning begin for the development of much more extensive, detailed, and 
accurate data bases than now exist for exposure assessments." See id. at 1804 (quoting NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY 'TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND 
PRIORITIES 124 (1984)). See also Slagel, supra note 8, at 853--54. 
68 Wagner, supra note 66, at 431-32. 
69 Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1796; Foster, supra note 48, at 156. 
70 The National Research Council states that the cost of a laboratory study of a single chemical 
is ''up to one million dollars." Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1812 & n.64 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, TOXICITY 'TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES 14, 199-295 
(1984)). 
71 Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1812-13. 
72 Id. at 1796. 
73 Id. at 1802. 
74 The most accepted method of compiling scientific data, in toxic torts, are epidemiological 
studies. See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1618 n.84. They compare the incidence 
of disease in two human groups, those exposed to a toxic substance and those unexposed, and 
determine the "excess risk" created by the toxic agent. See Shanna H. Swan, Epidemiology in 
the Courtroom: The Case of Silicone Breast Implants, 451 PLIILIT 401, PLI Order No. H4-5149 
(1992). Therefore, by definition they require an exposed class to facilitate the compilation of 
scientific data. 
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tims.75 Further, toxicity information is not accessible nationwide due 
to the lack of funding, cooperation, and computer databases.76 Finally, 
the significant latency period of cancer destines conclusive scientific 
data to be several decades behind the manifestation of the disease.77 
B. Traditional Tort Requirements Create Virtually 
Insurrrwuntable Barriers to Recovery in Toxic Torts 
The unique characteristics of toxic torts-the long latency and 
scientific uncertainty of the resulting diseases-have caused toxic 
exposure victims to encounter a number of almost insurmountable 
legal and practical barriers in recovering for their injuries.78 The most 
significant are statutes of limitations,79 the single cause of action rule,80 
and difficulty in proving causationP 
1. Statutes of Limitations Hinder Toxic Tort Recovery 
Statutes of limitations require that a cause of action be brought 
within a designated period of time, as determined by statute.82 If the 
maximum time period has elapsed, no legal action may be brought, 
regardless of whether a valid cause of action existed.83 Statutes of 
limitations were designed to limit the period of time within which 
defendants are subject to liability, while allowing a reasonable period 
of time for plaintiffs to bring a cause of action.84 The length of statutes 
75 Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1806--07. 
761d. at 1804. 
77 For example, in 1960 a benzene exposure case was dismissed because the causes of leukemia 
were unknown. See Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Sub-
stance Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965, 974 n.35 (1988) (citing Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 68 
N.E.2d 811, 813, modified on other grounds, 70 N.E.2d 214 (1960». Whereas, by the late 1970's 
benzene was recognized as causing leukemia. See id. at 974. See also Wagner, supra note 66, at 
428, 431 (first asbestos plaintiff recovered forty years after science knew asbestos was harmful 
because scientific data was previously insufficient to prove the cause of action). 
78 See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 667-75; Slagel, supra note 8, at 851-58; Strand, supra 
note 48, at 575; Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 851-52; Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 51, at 920-28. 
79 See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 669; Slagel, supra note 8, at 853-55; Strand, supra note 
46, at 580-81; Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 51, at 920. 
80 See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 669; Poston, supra note 9, at 161-68. 
81 See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 671-72; Slagel, supra note 8, at 854-55; Strand, supra 
note 48, at 583; Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 855-56; Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 51, at 922. 
82 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 30 at 165. 
83 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 639 (6th ed. 1991). 
84 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 1.1 at 11-16 (1991). 
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of limitations vary depending upon the cause of action85 and when the 
statute begins to run-Le., when the action accrues.86 
The traditional view was that statutes of limitations began to run 
at the time of the defendant's tortious act.87 However, in toxic tort 
cases this standard virtually prohibits recovery88 for a number of 
reasons. First, the statute of limitations often expires before a person 
is injured.89 For example, assume that the defendant improperly dis-
poses of a toxic substance in a landfill; the substance seeps into the 
groundwater; migrates a few feet per year until it reaches a public 
water supply; where it is ingested by the plaintiff.90 The statute of 
limitations began to run when the defendant improperly disposed of 
the toxic substance and may expire before the plaintiff ingests the 
toxic substance-before the plaintiff was injured. Second, the statute 
of limitations may expire prior to the time a person discovers they 
have been injured.91 Cancer and other exposure-related injuries have 
long latency periods which frequently span decades,92 and often ex-
ceed the relevant statute of limitations.93 Lastly, the statute of limita-
tions may expire before the person identifies the cause of the injury 
and/or the legally responsible party.94 Cancer and other exposure-re-
lated injuries are scientifically complex and uncertain,95 making it 
extremely difficult and time-consuming to determine causation.96 
85 SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY GROUP, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND DAM-
AGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES: RE-
PORT TO CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 301(E) OF THE CERCLA ACT OF 1980 (p.L. 
96-510) By THE "SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY GROUP" pt. 1 at 28 (Comm. Print 1982) 
[hereinafter SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP]. 
86 See SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 85, pt. 1 at 28; Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 
51, at 920-21 & n.259; see also Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 299 (N.J. 1987). 
87 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 30 at 165; see also Develapments in the Law, 
supra note 11, at 1604~5; Strand, supra note 48, at 580; SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra 
note 85, pt. 2 at 15. 
88 SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 85, pt. 1 at 28 & pt. 2 at 15. 
89 See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 30 at 165. See also Strand, supra note 48, at 
580-81. 
90 For example, contamination by groundwater, which is one of the primary paths of contami-
nation from landfills, "moves extremely slowly, perhaps only a few tens of feet per year." Strand, 
supra note 48, at 580-81 & n.21. 
91 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 30 at 165; Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 669; see 
Strand, supra note 48, at 580-81. 
92 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
93 Strand, supra note 48, at 580-81. 
94 See id. at 581; SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 85, pt. 1 at 28. 
95 See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text. 
96 See Strand, supra note 48, at 581. 
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The application of the traditional view of statutes of limitations 
virtually prohibits recovery in toxic torts. This result frustrates a 
purpose of statutes of limitations-the allowance of a reasonable pe-
riod of time for plaintiffs to bring causes of action.97 As a result, the 
majority of jurisdictions have abandoned the traditional view of stat-
utes of limitations and adopted the "discovery rule."98 
The "discovery rule" provides that an action accrues when an injury 
is discovered or should have reasonably been discovered.99 The dis-
covery rule's effectiveness in eradicating the inequity of statutes of 
limitations in toxic tort cases depends upon the legislative version 
and/or judicial interpretation of each jurisdiction, a factor which var-
ies significantly.10o 
In some jurisdictions the discovery rule is strictly construed and 
the cause of action is held to accrue when the injury is discovered, 
should reasonably have been discovered, or is capable of ascertain-
ment.101 This rule counteracts the effect of the latent nature of expo-
sure-related injuriesY12 However, it does not eradicate the difficulties 
caused by the scientific complexity and uncertainty of cancer and 
other exposure-related diseases.1OO 
Another version of the discovery rule provides that an action ac-
crues when the victim discovers both the injury and its possible 
97 See CORMAN, supra note 84, at 14. 
98 Slagel, supra note 8, at 854; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1605"'{)6; Ayers v. 
Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 299 (N.J. 1987). As of 1982, thirty-nine states had adopted 
a form of the "discovery rule." SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 85, pt. 1 at 28 & n.4. 
Alabama, Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, and Vermont 
have adopted it by statute. [d. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of 
Columbia, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming have 
adopted it by judicial interpretation. [d. New York adopted a version of the discovery rule in 
1986. See Green, supra note 77, at 978. For specific statute and case law information, see 
SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 85, pt.1 at 28 nA. 
99 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at 322. The "discovery rule" was first utilized 
in the field of medical malpractice and then borrowed by "dentists, accountants, architects, 
lawyers, manufacturers of defective products, and a miscellany of negligence and other tort 
actions." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, at § 30 at 167 (footnotes omitted). 
100 See Strand, supra note 48, at 581 & n.23; SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 85, pt. 1 
at 28-30. See also Ayers, 525 A.2d at 299-300. 
101 In 1982, this standard was utilized in Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Colum-
bia, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Tennessee. SUPERFUND 
STUDY GROUP, supra note 85, pt. 2 at 16-17. For a more in-depth analysis of each state's 
"discovery rule," see id. at 19...{i5. See also Strand, supra note 48, at 581 n.23. 
100 Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1606. 
100 See SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 85, pt. 1 at 28. 
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relationship to a toxic exposure.104 This version facilitates greater 
recovery, but frustrates a significant number of toxic tort claims. A 
person who develops cancer may need significant additional time after 
discovery of the injury to determine the exact cause of the injury and 
to identify any or all legally responsible parties.105 
A final version of the discovery rule provides that the cause of 
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known about 
the injury, its cause, and the cause of action.1OO This interpretation 
potentially provides toxic tort victims the greatest opportunity of 
recovery. However, it has not been widely adopted.107 
Toxic tort actions in jurisdictions utilizing the most liberal discov-
ery rules may not be statutorily precluded. However, in all other 
circumstances, statutes of limitations and weak discovery rules re-
main a substantial barrier to recovery in toxic tort cases.108 
2. The Single Controversy Rule Hinders Toxic Tort Recovery 
The single controversy rule lO9 requires a party to include all past, 
present, and future claims against an adversary in one cause of ac-
tion. l1° The failure to do so precludes a party from bringing a sub-
sequent action.11l The intent of the single controversy rule is to pro-
mote judicial economy.112 However, in toxic tort cases, the rule 
104 In 1982, the states that had adopted this version of the discovery rule were California, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 85, pt. 2 at 
17. See also Strand, supra note 48, at 581 n.23. 
106 Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1606. As the New Jersey Supreme Court 
observed, there is a significant difference between knowing the cause of an injury and knowing 
that the injury is "attributable to the fault or neglect of another." Lopez v. Swyer, 300 A.2d 563, 
567 (N.J. 1973). 
106 In 1982, the states that utilized this version of the discovery rule were Arizona, Colorado, 
Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Texas, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming. SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 85, pt. 2 at 17. Strand, 
supra note 48, at 581 n.23. 
107 This version of the rule has only been adopted by 13 jurisdictions. SUPERFUND STUDY 
GROUP, supra note 85, pt. 2 at 17. 
108 Slagel, supra note 82, at 854...u5; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1607. 
109 The single controversy rule is interchangeable known as the single recovery rule and the 
single cause of action rule. Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 669 n.37; Poston, supra, note 9, at 
161-62. 
110 See Blumenberg, supra note 7 at 669; Poston, supra note 9, at 162. See Ayers v. Thwnship 
of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 300 (N.J. 1987). 
111 Ayers, 525 A.2d at 300 (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Gilchrist Bros., Inc., 428 A.2d 1254 (1981»; 
see also Poston, supra note 9, at 162. 
112 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 300 (quoting Ajamian v. Schlanger, 103 A.2d 9, eert. denied, 348 U.S. 
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severely hinders recovery.113 When a toxic tort victim seeks recovery 
for immediate consequences from exposure, such as property damage 
or physical injury, the single controversy rule bars that person from 
any future recovery, such as the manifestation of a latent diseaseY4 
Due to the inequitable result of the application of this rule, some 
jurisdictions have rejected the single controversy rule in toxic tort 
cases.ll5 For example, in Eagle-Picher Industries v. Cox, the District 
Court of Appeals allowed the plaintiff to split the cause of action and 
subsequently bring a separate suit if the latent disease manifested 
itselfY6 The court based its decision on equitable grounds, stating 
"[t]he desirable goal of finality is not an absolute and ... the procedural 
rule against splitting causes of action must be relaxed when equitable 
considerations demand it."117 Similar equitable concerns led the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey, in Ayers v. Township of Jackson, to 
conclude that "the single controversy rule should [not] bar timely 
causes of action in toxic tort cases instituted after discovery of a 
disease or injury related to tortious conduct, although there has been 
prior litigation between the parties of different claims based on the 
same tortious conduct."118 
These decisions illustrate the courts' ability and desire to eradicate 
inequitable barriers against recovery in toxic tort cases. While this 
represents some progress, in many jurisdictions the single contro-
versy rule remains a substantial hindrance.l19 
835 (1954» (the single controversy rule is intended "to avoid the delays and wasteful expense 
of the multiplicity of litigation which results from splitting a controversy."); see also Poston, 
supra note 9, at 162. 
113 Ayers, 525 A.2d at 300; Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 669; Poston, supra note 9, at 163--64. 
114 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 669; Poston, supra note 9, at 164--65. 
115 See Poston, supra note 9, at 168 & n.40. 
116 481 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986). 
117 Id. at 521. 
liS 525 A.2d 287, 300 (N.J. 1987). See, e.g., Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 
320, modified on other grounds, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) (court stated "[a]t least in the toxic 
chemical or asbestos cases, the [latent exposure-related disease] should be treated as a separate 
cause of action for all purposes."); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 520 (5th 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) (the court allowed the plaintiff to split the cause of 
action and bring a separate suit if the latent disease manifested itself, stating "logic and justice 
require that presently latent injuries must await their separate maturity as to a cause of 
action.") 
119 Poston, supra note 9, at 175; Gregory L. Ash, 1bxic 1brts and Latent Diseases: The Case 
for an Increased Risk Cause of Action, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 1087, 1091-92 (1990). 
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3. Causation-The Most Insurmountable Barrier to Recovery 
Traditional tort law requires a plaintiff to prove the existence of a 
"reasonably close causal connection between the conduct [of the de-
fendant] and the [plaintiff's] injury."l20 This "causation" element must 
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.121 The courts employ 
strong and weak versions of the preponderance rule.l22 
The "strong version" ofthe preponderance of evidence rule has two 
components: it requires that the plaintiff show that it is more likely 
than not that the defendant's actions caused the injury; and "particu-
laristic" proof that the conduct caused the specific harm.l2il The "weak 
version" has only one component: it requires the plaintiff to show that 
it is more likely than not that the defendant's action caused the 
injury.l24 
In a traditional tort case, a plaintiff satisfies the causation element 
by illustrating a cause and effect relationship.125 For example, assume 
that a defendant ran a stop sign, hit the plaintiffs car, and the plaintiff 
suffered a broken leg. The plaintiff might present the following evi-
dence: testimony that on the day in question the plaintiff was unin-
jured when he entered his automobile; eyewitness testimony that the 
defendant ran a stop sign and hit the plaintiff's car; and medical 
testimony that when the plaintiff arrived at the hospital his leg was 
broken. This evidence would satisfy both the "weak" and "strong" 
versions of the preponderance rule.126 
In toxic torts cases, by contrast, the long latency and scientific 
uncertainty of exposure-related diseases prohibit the clear identifica-
tion of such a cause and effect relationship.l27 The long latency of 
120 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 30 at 164-65. 
121 To satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard, one must prove a probability 
greater than 50%. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 38 at 239. 
122 Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 857-58; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1619. 
123 Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 857; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1619. 
124 Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 857-58; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1619. 
126 Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 301 (N.J. 1987) (citing Allen v. United States, 
588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987»; see 
Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 857-58; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1619. 
126 The plaintiff has shown more likely than not that the actions of the defendant cause the 
injury and "particularized" proof as to the injury. 
127 See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1618-19; Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 
85&-57. The long latency and scientific complexity of exposure-related diseases prohibit the 
presentation of "particularistic" proof, thereby prohibiting toxic tort plaintiff's from satisfying 
the "strong version" of the preponderance rule. Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 859. See also 
Foster, supra note 48, at 147; Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 672; Slagel, supra note 8, at 853. 
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exposure-related diseases creates the opportunity for "intervening 
causes" to obscure any cause and effect relationship.l28 Further, the 
ambiguous etiology of cancer makes it virtually impossible to deter-
mine which toxic substance or collection of substances caused a par-
ticular disease.129 For example, a plaintiff unknowingly exposed to 
asbestos in 1962, and diagnosed with lung cancer in 1983/30 has virtu-
ally no way of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
lung cancer was more likely than not caused by the asbestos exposure, 
and not by tobacco inhalation131 or any number of other environmental 
factors. 132 
Since toxic tort plaintiffs cannot establish the traditional cause and 
effect relationship, they must prove causation by establishing a causal 
nexus between the disease and the hazardous substance.l33 This is 
accomplished by utilizing scientific data and expert testimony.l34 The 
most accepted scientific data is the epidemiological study,l35 which 
128 Ayers, 525 A.2d at 302 (quoting Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 405-06 (D. Utah 
1984), rev'd on other gronnds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987)) ("the mere passage of time is 
sufficient to raise doubts about 'cause' in the minds of a legal system accustomed to far more 
immediate chains of events.") For a more extensive discussion of the latency of toxic torts, see 
supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
129 See Slagel, supra note 8, at 854. When an exposure-related injury is discovered it is "rarely 
attributable to a single toxic agent." Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1617; Rosen-
berg, supra note 32, at 856 ("[r]arely is any particular toxic agent the exclusive source of a given 
disease."). For a more extensive discussion of the scientific complexity of toxic torts, see supra 
notes 57-77 and accompanying text. 
130 The latency period for asbestos-related disease is twenty years or more. See Kirkland, 
supra note 62, at 377. 
131 Asbestos exposure "has been linked with asbestosis (a debilitating lung disease) and 
mesothelioma (a rare cancer of the chest and abdominal lining), as well as with cancers of the 
lung, esophagus, stomach, colon, and other organs." See id. at 376. 
132 The EPA estimates 733,000 public and commercial buildings contain asbestos. See id. at 
375 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (1988)). 
133 Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1618. Instead of proving that A caused B, the 
toxic tort plaintiff attempts to show that A creates a greater risk that B will occur. See id. at 
1619. The preponderance rule, even the application of the "weak version," requires that plaintiffs 
establish that A creates a great than 50% risk that B will occur. [d. 
134 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 673. A number of studies are used by scientists to determine 
causal relationships. These include: the epidemiological study, which compares patterns of 
disease in exposed and unexposed humans; the cluster analysis, which reviews clusters of 
diseases and searches for common toxic exposure; short-term molecular assays, which "take 
advantage of the similarities between the metabolic processes of humans and other forms of life 
to develop experiments that are relatively inexpensive and quick to complete;" and animal 
bioassays, where "scientists give several hundred mammals prescribed doses of a particular 
toxic substance and then identify causes of death in the animal cohort." [d. at 673 & n.52 (quoting 
2 AMERICAN LAW INST., ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 321-24 (1991)). 
135 The epidemiological study is considered the best, if not the only, proof of causation in toxic 
tort cases. See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1231 (describing epidemiological 
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analyzes patterns of disease in the human population.l36 An epidemi-
ologist compares the incidence of disease in two groups: those ex-
posed, and those not exposed, to a toxic substance, in order to deter-
mine the "excess risk" created by the substance.137 
Traditionally, courts were reluctant to rely upon statistical evi-
dence, such as epidemiological studies, to determine causation.l38 
Some courts, realizing the crucial importance of scientific data in toxic 
tort cases, have accepted such evidence as proof of causation.l39 And 
in those cases, if the scientific data indicates a more likely than not 
chance that the toxic substance caused the injury, the toxic tort 
plaintiff can recover.l40 However, this result rarely occurs.l4l In most 
cases, statistical evidence cannot satisfy even the "weaker" version of 
the preponderance rule. l42 Therefore, the causation element remains 
a virtually insurmountable barrier to recovery in toxic tort cases.l43 
4. Practical Factors that Hinder Toxic Tort Recovery 
In addition to the aforementioned problems, a host of practical 
factors severely hinder recovery in toxic tort cases. First, the iden-
tification of the legally responsible party is often difficult, if not im-
possible.l44 This is due to the generic character of the toxic products,145 
studies as "the only useful studies having any bearing on causation" questions in toxic exposure 
cases). 
136 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 673 & n.52; Swan, supra note 74. 
137 See Swan, supra note 74; Foster, supra note 48, at 15I. 
138 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1240 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
139 See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1618; In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 
1239-41; In re Swine Flu Immunization Products Liab. Litig., 508 F. Supp. 897, 907 (D. Colo. 
1981). 
140 See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1618-19. The scientific data must show 
that the "excess risk" of the exposure exceeds the background risk of contracting the disease. 
Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 858. 
141 See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1619. Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 858. 
142 See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1619; Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 858. 
For a discussion of why statistical evidence is uncertain and inconclusive, see supra notes 67-77 
and accompanying text. 
143 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 673--74; Slagel, supra note 8, at 853; Strand, supra note 48, 
at 584-85. Long latency periods and the mysteries of disease etiology necessitate exclusive 
reliance on statistical evidence, therefore, the strong version of the preponderance rule requires 
the dismissal of all mass exposure claims and the weak version results in the dismissal of most 
cases. Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 858. 
144 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 674-75; Slagel, supra note 8, at 853; Strand, supra note 48, 
at 584-85; Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 51, at 925. 
145 Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 856. Similar, even identical, toxic substances are often pro-
duced by multiple manufacturers, making it virtually impossible to identify exactly who pro-
duced the substance. For example, diethylstilbestrol (DES) was produced by over 200 compa-
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the inconspicuousness of the exposure event,146 and the long latency 
period of exposure-related diseases.147 Second, the prevalence of "cov-
ert, illicit" dumping complicates the process of identifying the legally 
responsible party.148 An EPA study indicated that a significant num-
ber of the 1,200 to 2,000 imminently dangerous hazardous waste sites 
in the United States are "abandoned" and that the owner has not, nor 
will not, be identified.149 Third, even if the responsible party is iden-
tifiable, that party may escape liability.l50 This occurs when the re-
sponsible party, such as a corporation, is no longer in business151 or is 
financially unable to satisfy its debts.152 Fourth, toxic tort litigation is 
very expensive and many plaintiffs are unable to bear the financial 
burden of protracted litigation.l53 In order to prove causation,154 a 
plaintiff must gather extensive scientific evidence and employ numer-
ous experts, each of which is an enormously costly endeavor.155 This 
barrier is exacerbated by the fact that many of those persons exposed 
to hazardous substances are economically disadvantaged.156 Lastly, 
nies between the years of 1941 and 1971. Sind ell v. Abbott Lab, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 931 (Cal.), 
cert. denied sub nom. Upjohn Co. v. Sind ell, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). 
146 Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 856 & n.30. Often persons are exposed to hazardous sub-
stances without their knowledge. For example, in DES cases, females in utero were exposed to 
the hazardous substance and were unaware until decades later when they contracted vaginal 
cancer. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925. 
147 Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 856 & n.30; Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 51, at 922-23. An 
additional complication arises if exposure to the toxic agent occurred during employment. 
Potentially the employee worked for several employers within one field, all of whom utilized the 
toxic agent. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 51, at 922-23. 
148 Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note at 925; Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 670. 
149 Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 51, at 925 (citing FRED C. HART ASSOCIATES, PRELIMINARY 
ASSESSMENT OF CLEANUP COSTS FOR NATIONAL HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEMS 22 (1979) 
(report on work performed for Office of Solid Waste, EPA, contract no. 68-D1-5063)). 
11» See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 670; Strand, supra note 48, at 584-85; Ayers v. Township 
of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 299 (N.J. 1987). 
151 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 670. 
152 Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 51, at 926. When toxic manufacturers or disposers are small 
corporations or when it is a large number of plaintiffs, the damage claims may exceed the assets 
of the company, forcing them to file bankruptcy. Slagel, supra note 8, at 856 n.39 (citing Roe, 
Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984)). When a company files bankruptcy 
they are discharged from some current debts and all future debts. Id. See also Strand, supra 
note 48, at 585. 
153 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 671; Slagel, supra note 8, at 855-56; Strand, supra note 48, 
at 585-86; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 299. 
154 Causation is an essential element that must be satisfied, in any tort action. See PROSSER 
& KEETON, supra note 11, § 30 at 165. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
155 Slagel, supra note 8, at 855-56; Strand, supra note 48, at 585-86; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 299. 
156 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 671 & n.44. In one survey, it was determined that the majority 
of Los Angeles' "economically disadvantaged population live in the most polluted areas." Id. 
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due to the barriers discussed above, many toxic tort plaintiffs are 
strongly encouraged to settle prematurely157 or forego the cause of 
action entirely.158 
5. The Purposes of Tort Law are Frustrated by Toxic Torts 
Tort law is designed to compensate victims of wrongful conduct and 
to deter similar tortious conduct in the future. 159 In the field of toxic 
torts, these purposes are frustrated. 160 The legal barriers of statutes 
of limitations,161 the single controversy rule,162 and proof of causa-
tion,163 in addition to numerous practical barriers,164 virtually ensure 
that many toxic tort plaintiffs are not fully compensated for their 
injuries.165 This uncertainty of recovery discourages legitimate legal 
actions from being pursued166 and encourages premature settle-
ments.l67 
The deterrence function of tort law is also severely frustrated in 
toxic tort cases.168 Because manufacturers, distributors, and disposers 
of toxic substances are rarely held fully liable for their wrongful 
actions, they have no economic incentive to adopt measures which will 
(citing Home Street, USA- Living With Pollution, GREENPEACE, OctJNov./Dec. 1991, at 8,10). 
Further, on Chicago's southeast side, an economically disadvantaged area, 150,000 residents 
"live with 50 active or closed commercial hazardous waste landfills, 100 factories (including 7 
chemical plants and 5 steel mills), and 102 abandoned toxic waste dumps." [d. 
157 Blumenberg, su'[Jl"a note 7, at 671; Strand, supra note 48, at 586. Bargaining inequities 
between plaintiffs and defendants, especially corporate defendants, exist in most cases, but are 
more pronounced in toxic tort cases due to the "uncertainty of eventual recovery." Strand, supra 
note 48, at 586. 
158 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 671; Strand, supra note 48, at 586. 
159 In essence, tort law attempts to balance the rights of the individual, to receive compensa-
tion, and the rights of society, to have future deleterious activity deterred. See PROSSER & 
KEETON, supra note 11, § 1 at 6 & § 4 at 25-26. 
160 Slagel, supra note 8, at 856-57; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1630. 
161 For a comprehensive discussion of the legal barriers to recovery, created by the statutes 
of limitations, see supra notes 82-108 and accompanying text. 
162 For a comprehensive discussion of the legal barriers to recovery, created by the single 
controversy rule, see supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text. 
163 For a comprehensive discussion of the legal barriers to recovery, created by the causation 
requirements, see supra notes 120-43 and accompanying text. 
164 For a comprehensive discussion of the practical barriers to recovery in toxic tort cases, see 
supra notes 144-58 and accompanying text. 
165 See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 662; Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 855-59; Strand, supra 
note 48, at 581-88; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1602-12, 1616-22; Ginsberg & 
Weiss, supra note 51, at 920-28. 
166 Slagel, supra note 8, at 856. 
167 [d.; Strand, supra note 48, at 579. 
168 Slagel, supra note 8, at 856; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1630. 
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prevent or minimize future harm.169 Further, the reoccurrence of can-
cer and other exposure-related diseases cannot be averted because 
scientific data, concerning the effect of toxic chemicals on people, is 
often unavailable, inconclusive, or both.17° 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF NON-TRADITIONAL TORT REMEDIES TO 
ACCOMMODATE THE UNIQUE NATURE OF ToXIC ToRTS 
A. Tort Law As The Means for Change 
Common law is a "body of law that develops and derives through 
judicial decisions."l71 Tort law is overwhelmingly common law.172 As 
such, tort law is constantly developing and adapting, in response to 
changing societal circumstances.l73 Tort law adaptation typically oc-
curs incrementally, on a case-by-case basis.174 Occasionally, more dra-
matic changes occur when a court recognizes a novel claim,175 decides 
a case of first impression,176 or overrules an existing precedent.177 
The widespread use of toxic substances, the proliferation of expo-
sure to those substances, the unique nature of the resulting injuries, 
and the inapplicability of existing tort law, initially triggered incre-
mental adaptations of traditional tort doctrine.178 For example, courts 
adopted the "discovery rule," thereby extending the statute of limi-
tations;179 rejected the "single controversy rule," allowing for multiple 
169 Slagel, supra note 8, at 856-57. "Mass exposure torts are frequently products of the 
deliberate policies of businesses that tailor safety investments to profit margins. Such risk-tak-
ing policies should be especially amenable to control through threats of liability." Rosenberg, 
supra note 32, at 855. 
170 Scientific uncertainty results in the continued use of potentially hazardous substances. See 
Gara, supra note 3, at 265-66; Wagner, supra note 66, at 430. 
171 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at 189. 
172 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 3 at 19. 
173 See id.; Slagel, supra note 8, at 850; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1602. Tort 
law has and will continue to change in response to changing societal circumstances. PROSSER & 
KEETON, supra note 11, § 3 at 19. 
174 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, at § 3 at 18--19. 
1751d. § 3 at 18. "[T]he mere fact that a claim is novel does not defeat it." ld. For example, in 
this century "courts have first recognized an action for prenatal injuries, an action for wrongful 
birth, a recovery by a wife for personal injury at the hands of her husband, new tort liabilities 
of municipal corporations, and a whole new field of actions for nervous shock and mental 
suffering." ld. § 3 at 19 (footnotes omitted). 
1761d. § 3 at 18--19. When a court decides an issue of first impression, it must balance the 
interests ofthe plaintiff, the defendant, and the general public. ld. § 3 at 17. 
177 ld. § 3 at 18--19. "Devotion to precedent is one thing; distrust of new ideas, quite another." 
ld. § 3 at 19. 
178 See infra notes 179--82 and accompanying text. 
179 See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text. 
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causes of action;180 developed a "weak version" of the preponderance 
rule, to ease the burden of causation;181 and, accepted statistical data 
as proof of causation, because it provides the best, if not the only, 
available evidence.182 These incremental changes have proven in-
sufficient to eradicate the inequities suffered by toxic torts victims.183 
As a result, numerous innovative damage theories were developed 
and to varying degrees, recognized by the courtS.184 These include 
claims for fear of future illness,185 enhanced risk of future disease,186 
medical monitoring damages,187 and public health funds.188 
180 See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra notes 123--24 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text. 
183 See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 667-75; Slagel, supra note 8, at 851-58; Rosenberg, supra 
note 32, at 855-59; Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 51, at 920--28. Some commentators state that 
common law doctrines and the courts are incapable of accommodating toxic torts. Slagel, supra 
note 8, at 857; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1630--31; 'Irauberman, supra note 56, 
at 188-202; SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 85, pt. 1 at 130--32. They argue that the 
court system's incremental changes are insufficient to implement the far-reaching changes 
necessary and advocate legislative action as the solution. Slagel, supra note 8, at 857; SUPER-
FUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 85, pt. 1 at 193--271. The validity of these views need not be 
addressed, because legislative action has done little to provide recovery to victims of toxic 
exposure. See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 675-76; Slagel, supra note 8, at 857. 
In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
[hereinafter CERCLA] was enacted. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Noticeably 
absent from CERCLA were any provisions granting private parties the right to recover for 
personal injury. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1535-36 (10th Cir. 1992); Ambrogi V. Gould, 
750 F. Supp. 1233, 1239 (M.D. Pa. 1990); Dan A. Tanenbaum, When Does Going to the Doctor 
Serve the Public Health? Medical Monitoring Response Costs under CERCLA, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 925, 926 (1992). Only one CERCLA provision has been interpreted potentially to provide 
such recovery. See Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1239; Tanenbaum, supra note 183, at 926. Section 
9607(a)(4)(B) states, in pertinent part, "that certain responsible parties may be sued for: a) all 
costs of removal or remedial action incurred ... ; and b) any other necessary costs of response 
incurred by any other person .... " 
While courts initially interpreted the language of section 9607(a)(4)(B) to provide some 
recovery to private parties, the current trend is to narrowly interpret this provision and to deny 
private party recovery for injury. See, e.g., Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1532-37 (court stated that under 
CERCLA the "necessary costs of response" were those necessary to containment and cleanup 
of hazardous releases and held that plaintiffs were not entitled to recover medical monitoring 
damages); Bolin V. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 714 CD. Kan. 1991) (court held that 
medical testing and health assessment costs cannot be recovered under CERCLA); Ambrogi, 
750 F. Supp. at 1244 (court held that medical monitoring damages are not "necessary costs of 
response" under CERCLA). 
184 The most common damage theories are fear of future illness, enhanced risk of future 
disease, and medical monitoring damages. Slagel, supra note 8, at 858-59; DORE, supra note 12, 
§ 7.01 at 7-2; Rudlin & Stravitz, supra note 12; Lovell et aI., supra note 44. Less commonly 
asserted theories are impaired quality-of-life and loss-of-chance. Slagel, supra note 8, at 858-59. 
185 See infra notes 189-205 and accompanying text. 
186 See infra notes 206-27 and accompanying text. 
187 See infra notes 232-316 and accompanying text. 
188 See infra notes 317-76 and accompanying text. 
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B. Early Theories of Non-Traditional Tort Recoveries 
The claim of "fear of future illness"189 is a claim for a present injury, 
such as emotional distress or apprehension, due to the potential for 
future injury, such as cancer or other exposure-related diseases.19o 
Traditionally, without a presently discernible injury,l91 tort law pro-
hibited recovery of such claims.l92 However, in response to the inade-
quacies of traditional tort law in toxic tort cases, some courts have 
modified this standard and recognized a cause of action for fear of 
future illness.193 
Most jurisdictions recognizing a fear of future illness cause of action 
require that the plaintiff's fear of contracting a future illness be genu-
ine and "reasonable."194 For example, in Potter v. Firestone Tire and 
Rubber Co., the California Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's 
fear of contracting cancer from ingesting water contaminated with 
benzene and vinyl chloride, both known human carcinogens,195 was 
genuine and "reasonable."l96 
Jurisdictions vary significantly as to the degree of physical mani-
festation required for recovery.197 Some courts allow recovery absent 
any physical injury.198 For example, in Hagerty v. L & L Marine 
Services, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
189 The claim, fear of future illness, is also referred to as "cancerphobia." Arvin Maskin & Peter 
A. Antonucci, Overview and Update of Emerging Damage Theories in Toxic Tort Litigation, 
C837 ALI-ABA 629, 650 (1993). 
190 Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 650. See also Slagel, supra note 8, at 860; Rudlin 
& Stravitz, supra note 12, at 73; Lovell et aI., supra note 44; DORE, supra note 12, § 7.03 at 
7-10-7-11. 
191 The requirement is that there must be a physical injury from the impact or from the 
emotional distress. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 54 at 363. 
192 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 54 at 363; see also Slagel, supra note 8, at 859; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 436A (1965). The courts considered claims for emotional 
distress to be highly speculative and difficult to assess genuineness. Maskin & Antonucci, supra 
note 189, at 650. 
193 See Slagel, supra note 8, at 859-B0. 
194 Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 650, 663; Rudlin & Stravitz, supra note 12. 
195 See 274 Cal. Rptr. 885, 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 25 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 550 (1993). 
196 Potter, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 897. See also Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 
317, 318-19, modified on other grounds, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) (court held that plaintiff 
doused in drip alene, a known carcinogen, who studied about the chemical and quit job to avoid 
further exposure was genuine and his fear was reasonable). 
1!11 Jurisdictions range from allowing recovery without any physical injury to requiring mani-
festation of an injury and are split as to whether slight injuries, ingestions, exposures, or 
subcellular changes are sufficient for recovery. See Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 
650-B3. For a comprehensive discussion of injury requirements in toxic tort cases, see id. at 
650-73. 
193 See Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 650, 663; Rudlin & Stravitz, supra note 12; 
Lovell et al., supra note 44. 
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cuit held that the plaintiff, who was doused in dripolene, a known 
human carcinogen, was entitled to recover damages for fear of future 
illness, with or without a physical injury.l99 Other courts have held 
that any physical symptom, no matter how trivial or small, satisfies 
the physical injury requirement.2oo For example, in Villari v. Terminix 
International, Inc., the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania held that the physical injury requirement was satisfied 
by the plaintiff's suffering from headaches, nausea, and dizziness.20! 
And still other courts have held that the ingestion of a toxic substance 
satisfies the physical injury requirement.202 For example, in Herber v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit held that the infiltration of asbestos fibers into the 
plaintiff's lungs and the resulting pleural thickening, while a slight 
impact and injury, were sufficient to satisfy the physical injury re-
quirement.203 The majority of jurisdictions however, require the mani-
festation of a physical injury as a prerequisite to recovery.204 The 
majority view is illustrated by the decision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 
which held that a physical injury was required to recover a fear of 
future illness claim, and mere exposure does not constitute such an 
injury.205 
Another innovative damage theory recognized by the courts is the 
enhanced risk of future illness claim.2OO An enhanced risk of future 
illness claim provides recovery in a present action, for a significant 
199 788 F.2d at 317-19; see also Potter, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 888, 891 (court held that plaintiff, who 
ingested toxic water, need not have a physical injury to bring a fear of future illness claim). 
200 Lovell et aI., supra note 44; see Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 656-57. 
201 677 F. Supp. 330, 337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1987); see also Friedman v. F.E. Myers Co., 706 F. Supp. 
376,380-81 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (district court held that disorientation and dizziness were sufficient 
physical injuries, to survive defendant's motion for summary judgement); Anderson v. W.R. 
Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1226 (D. Mass. 1986) (court held that plaintiffs' alleged physical 
symptoms, harm to their bodies ability to fight disease and to their body's organs was sufficient 
to maintain their claims for emotional distress damages). 
202 See Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 657; Lovell et ai., supra note 44. For an 
extensive discussion of courts holding that ingestion of toxic substance constitutes physical 
injury, see Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 657-60. 
203 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 527 
(Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986) (court held that the inhalation 
of asbestos fibers into lungs satisfied the impact rule, therefore no physical manifestation of 
injury was necessary). 
204 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 54 at 362-63; see also DORE, supra note 12, § 7.03 
at 7-11; Slagel, supra note 8, at 860; Rudlin & Stravitz, supra note 12. 
205 958 F.2d 36, 38 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 876 (1992); see also Friedman v. F.E. Myers 
& Co., 706 F. Supp. 376, 381 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (district court granted summary judgement against 
plaintiffs exposed to contaminated water because there was no manifestation of physical injury). 
206 See Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 629; Slagel, supra note 8, at 859-{i0. 
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risk of future disease.2()7 This cause of action differs from fear of future 
illness damages because the plaintiff does not claim a present injury 
but seeks to recover for a potential future injury.208 Traditional tort 
doctrine prohibited such causes of action by requiring an actual injury 
as a prerequisite to recovery.209 However, in response to the long 
latency of exposure-related diseases and the barriers to recovery 
created by statutes of limitations,210 some courts modified the tradi-
tional standard and recognized this novel claim.211 
The jurisdictions that recognize the enhanced risk of future illness 
cause of action require the plaintiff to prove, through statistical data, 
that the future illness will develop.212 The degree of statistical cer-
tainty required varies by jurisdiction.213 The majority of jurisdictions 
employ the "reasonable medical certainty" standard.214 This standard 
requires that the plaintiff prove it is "more likely than not" that they 
will suffer from the future illness.215 This stringent requirement, which 
is similar to the preponderance of evidence standard, virtually pro-
hibits recovery in toxic tort cases.216 For example, in Mauro v. Ray-
mark Industries, Inc., the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the 
plaintiff's claim for enhanced risk of future illness because the plaintiff 
2(17 Lovell et aI., supra note 44. 
208 See Slagel, supra note 8, at 859-B0. 
209 PROSSER & KEETON, supm note 11, § 2 at 6. See also Slagel, supra note 8, at 859 (quoting 
Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D. Colo. 1984) (''This requirement is 
premised in the principle of tort law that the plaintiff must establish an injury that is not 
speCUlation to recover damages.")). 
210 See Brent Carson, Increased Risk of Disease from Hazardous Waste: A Praposal for 
Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REV. 635, 636-37 (1985). 
211 See Maskin & Antonucci, supm note 189, at 641-42; Slagel, supra note 8, at 858. 
212 See Slagel, supra note 8, at 860; Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 635. For an 
extensive discussion of existing caselaw, see Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 635-40. 
213 Essentially two standards are applied; "reasonable medical certainty" and "reasonable 
probability." See infra notes 214-27 and accompanying text. 
214 Carson, supra note 210, at 637-38; Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 635-40 (describ-
ing decisions holding that plaintiffs must satisfy the "reasonable medical certainty" standard); 
see DORE, supra note 12, § 7.07[1] at 7-16.2; Slagel, supra note 8, at 860; Lovell et aI., supra 
note 44. 
215 In other words the plaintiff must show a greater than 50% likelihood that they will contract 
the future illness. Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 635. See also Ayers v. Township of 
Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 306 (N.J. 1987). 
216 Some victims of toxic exposure do recover under this standard. See, e.g., Jackson v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) 
(allowing recovery for increased risk of illness where evidence indicated that plaintiff, exposed 
to asbestos, had a greater than 50% chance of contracting cancer); Gideon v. Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985) (court allowed for recovery when proof indicated 
by a reasonable medical certainty that illness would develop.) For a discussion ofthe difficulties 
toxic tort plaintiff encounter proving causation, see Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 635; 
Slagel, supra note 8, at 859. See supra notes 120-43 and accompanying text. 
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could not prove that it was "more likely than not" that cancer would 
result from the asbestos exposure.217 The court stated that without 
such proof the claim was "merely speculative."218 The court's rationale, 
shared by the majority, was that public policy considerations prohibit 
granting recovery for a "speculative" disease, which might never 
develop.219 
While most jurisdictions require "reasonable medical certainty," 
some adhere to the more lenient "reasonable probability" standard. 
This standard, while statistically undefined, requires a lower standard 
of proof than the traditional "more likely than not" standard and 
provides the best opportunity for recovery for toxic tort plaintiffs.2ro 
For example, in Valori v. Johns-Manville Sales COrp.,221 the District 
Court for the District of New Jersey held that statistical evidence, 
indicating that the plaintiff had a forty-three percent risk of contract-
ing a disease, satisfied the "reasonable probability" standard.222 The 
court reasoned that the "more likely than not" standard was too 
burdensome in toxic tort cases and therefore a more flexible standard 
should apply.223 
One significant limitation of the "reasonable probability" standard 
is that recovery is often precluded due to the scientific uncertainty of 
cancer and other exposure-related diseases.224 For example, in Ayers 
v. Township of Jackson, the plaintiffs, who were exposed to and 
217 561 A.2d 257, 258, 262 (N.J. 1989). See, e.g., Hagerty v. L. L. Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 
319 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) (court stated "a plaintiff 
can recover [damages for enhanced risk] only where he can show that the toxic exposure more 
probably than not will lead to cancer"). 
218 Mauro, 561 A.2d at 262. See, e.g., Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319 (court stated plaintiff must show 
that toxic exposure will more probably than not will lead to cancer to recover for enhanced risk 
of illness); Anderson v. w.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (D. Mass. 1986) (court held 
that "when an injured person seeks to recover for harms that may result in the future, recovery 
depends upon establishing a reasonable probability that the harm will occur). 
219 DORE, supra note 12, § 7.07[1] at 7-16.2-7-16.6. See, e.g., Ayers, 525 A.2d at 307 ("a cause 
of action for unquantified enhanced risk claims exposes the tort system, and the public it serves, 
to the task of litigating vast numbers of claims for compensation based on threats of injuries 
that may never occur."). 
220 See DORE, supra note 12, § 7.07[1] at 7-16.6; Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 641. 
For an extensive examination of cases applying the "reasonable probability" standard, see 
Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 189, at 641. 
221 No. 82-26861985 WL 6074 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 1985). 
2221985 WL 6074, at *3. See, e.g., Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Colo. 
1984) (court held that plaintiffs, who claimed subcellular damage to their chromosomes, could 
recover for enhanced risk of future disease since they demonstrated a definite physical injury). 
223 See Valori, 1985 WL 6074, at *3, (court stated that threshold of more likely than not is too 
burdensome for plaintiffs given the modest purpose of the "reasonable probability" standard). 
224 For a discussion of proof of causation barriers stemming from scientific uncertainty of 
cancer and other exposure-related disease, see supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text. 
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ingested toxic chemicals, were denied recovery because there was no 
quantification of their risk of contracting an exposure-related dis-
ease.225 The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that without quan-
tification of the risk, the "reasonable probability" standard was not 
satisfied.226 The court further reasoned that the speculative nature of 
an unquantified enhanced risk cause of action, the difficulties inherent 
in adjudicating such claims, and the principles of tort law, argue 
against the recognition of this cause of action.227 
In spite of the foregoing limitations, early theories of non-tradi-
tional tort remedies have provided toxic tort plaintiffs with some 
measure of relief.228 However, as long as the majority of jurisdictions 
require the manifestation of a physical injury229 and adhere to the 
"reasonable medical certainty" standard280 as prerequisites to recov-
ery, these adaptations will be insufficient to equitably compensate 
victims of toxic exposure.231 
C. Medical Monitoring Damages 
Medical monitoring damages are the most widely-accepted, innova-
tive theory recognized by the courts in the field of toxic torts.232 A 
claim for medical monitoring damages233 is a claim for the post-expo-
sure, pre-symptom compensation of future periodic medical examina-
tions, designed to facilitate early detection and diagnosis of exposure-
related diseases.234 This cause of action emanates from traditional tort 
22ii See 525 A.2d 287, 308 (N.J. 1987). See also Anderson v. w,R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 
1219, 1230-32 (D. Mass. 1986) (district court held that plaintiff, who ingested toxic chemicals, 
could not recover under enhanced risk of illness cause of action because there was no quantifica-
tion of the increased risk, and therefore the ''reasonable probability" standard was not satisfied). 
226 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 308. 
227 I d. at 307 --D8. Specifically, the court stated that recognition of such a cause of action would 
generate substantial litigation, provide excess burden on judges attempting to assess damages 
without clear guidelines, and escalate insurance rates. ld. at 307. 
228 Slagel, supra note 8, at 859. For additional examples, see supra notes 194--203,220-23 and 
accompanying text. 
229 Slagel, supra note 8, at 860. For additional examples, see supra notes 214--19 and accom-
panying text. 
230 Slagel, supra note 8, at 860; Carson, supra note 210, at 638. 
231 As long as the majority of jurisdictions require the manifestation of an injury, prior to 
recovery for fear of future illness, a significant number of plaintiffs will be unable to recover. 
See Slagel, supra note 8, at 860. 
232 ld. at 858--59; Rudlin & Stravitz, supra note 12. One commentator described medical 
monitoring damages as one of the "most radical revolutions" in tort law. See Rudlin & Stravitz, 
supra note 12. 
233 Courts and commentators use the terms medical monitoring and medical surveillance 
interchangeably. See, e.g., Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 678. 
234 See id. at 663; Rudlin & Stravitz, supra note 12; Allan Kanner, Medical Monitoring: State 
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doctrines,235 accepted medical principles,236 and public policy consid-
erations.237 
1. Legal Foundations of Medical Monitoring Damages 
Medical monitoring damages originated from two traditional tort 
doctrines, the "avoidable consequences" rule and the "allowance of 
medical expense damages" rule.238 The traditional tort doctrine, the 
avoidable consequences rule, denies a plaintiff recovery for an injury, 
that could have been avoided by "reasonable conduct."239 For example, 
assume that the defendant runs a stop sign, hits the plaintiff's car, and 
the plaintiff suffers a broken leg. The plaintiff does not seek medical 
treatment, the leg heals badly, and the plaintiff is permanently crip-
pled. Under the avoidable consequences rule, the plaintiff can recover 
damages for the original broken leg, but cannot recover additional 
damages for the severity of the injury.24o This is because the severity 
of the injury could have been avoided through the exercise of "rea-
sonable conduct."241 
By analogy, in the field of toxic torts, the avoidable consequences 
rule requires that the victims of toxic exposure undergo "medically 
advisable" treatment or forfeit their right to recovery.242 The medical 
and legal communities deem periodic medical examinations, which 
facilitate the early detection of cancer and other serious exposure-re-
lated diseases, as "medically advisable" treatment.243 As a result, the 
and Federal Perspectives, 2 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (1989). See also In re Paoli Railroad Yard 
PCB Litig. v. Monsanto Co., 916 F.2d 829, 850 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991); 
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 308-D9 (N.J. 1987). 
235 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 308-11; Slagel, supra note 8, at 863-66. See infra notes 238--56 and 
accompanying text. 
236 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311; Slagel, supra note 8, at 867-69. See infra notes 257--59 and 
accompanying text. 
237 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 308-12 (Supreme Court of New Jersey reasoned that medical 
monitoring damages were consistent with legal, medical, and public policy principles). See also 
Slagel, supra note 8, at 869-70. See infra notes 260-66 and accompanying text. 
238 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 678; Slagel, supra note 8, at 863; see, e.g., Hagerty v. L. & L. 
Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir.), modijied on other grounds, 797 F.2d 256 (5th 
Cir.1986). 
239 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 65 at 458--59. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
ToRTS § 918(1) (1977). 
240 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 65 at 458. 
241 Id. § 65 at 458. 
242 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 678-79 (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF DAMAGES § 90 (1935». See also Slagel, supra note 8, at 865. 
243 See Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405, 419-20 (N.J. 1983) (court discusses that it is univer-
sally agreed within the medical community that delay in diagnosis and treatment of cancer 
increases risk of mesas to sis and that this information is widely disseminated and accepted 
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avoidable consequences rule dictates that victims of toxic exposure 
must undergo periodic medical examinations or forfeit all, or part, of 
their right to recovery.244 Requiring victims of toxic torts to pay for 
these medical examinations to preserve the right to recovery, is in-
equitable and subverts the very purposes of tort law.245 Therefore, 
the avoidable consequences rule supports the recognition of medical 
monitoring damages in the field of toxic torts. 
The "allowance of medical expense damages" rule, under traditional 
tort law, provides that the plaintiff who suffers an injury is entitled 
to recover past and future medical expenses, incurred as a result of 
the injury.246 For example, assume that the defendant runs a stop sign, 
hits the plaintiff's car, and the plaintiff suffers a broken leg. While at 
the hospital, the plaintiff undergoes a battery of tests to determine 
the severity of the injury. This rule entitles the plaintiff to recover 
the cost of the diagnostic tests, as well as any "reasonable" future 
medical expenses.247 
Some jurisdictions adapted the allowance of medical expenses doc-
trine to allow plaintiffs recovery of medical expense damages, absent 
a present physical injury.24S In Friends For All Children, Inc. v. 
throughout society); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987) (court acknow-
ledged that the value of early detection and treatment for cancer patients is well-documented 
and accepted throughout the medical community). 
244 The "avoidable consequences" rule can have devastating effects on victims of toxic expo-
sure. When the effect of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent actions cannot be deline-
ated, the plaintiff may be totally barred from recovery. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 65 
at 459. This occurrence is likely in toxic tort cases, due to the ambiguous etiology of cancer and 
other exposure-related diseases. See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1618 & n.83 
(quoting David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" 
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 851, 856 (1984) ("[r]arely is any particular toxic 
agent the exclusive source of a given disease."»; Slagel, supra note 8, at 852. 
245 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311-12; Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 
F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litig. v. Monsanto Co., 916 F.2d 
829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990), eert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991). 
246 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 310--11 (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
OF DAMAGES, § 90 at 323-27 (1935»; Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 
(5th Cir.), modijied on other gronnds, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986). See also Blumenberg, supra 
note 7, at 673; Slagel, supra note 8, at 863. 
247 Usually the courts deem expenses as ''reasonable,'' when the medical expert testifies that 
they are necessary. See, e.g., Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319 (court held that physician's testimony that 
future diagnostic tests were necessary was sufficient to satisfy "reasonableness" standard). 
248 The courts have "effectively" adapted the doctrine to provide recovery, absent a physical 
injury. In actuality, the courts concluded that the need for diagnostic testing constituted an 
injury, as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states an injury is "the invasion 
of any legally protected interest of another." Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft 
Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1965»; 
see, e.g., Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 317 (fifth circuit allowed plaintiff who was drenched in a toxic 
substance, to recover past and future medical expenses, reasoning that plaintiff's injury was 
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Lockheed Aircraft Corp., the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia held that 149 children, who were victims of an airplane's 
decompression and crash, were entitled to recover the cost of future 
diagnostic examinations even though there was no present manifes-
tation of an injury.249 The court reasoned that equity requires that 
plaintiffs be able to recover the cost of diagnostic testing, regardless 
of whether the examinations were the result of a manifested or po-
tential injury.250 The court further observed that such recovery serves 
the principles of tort law by compensating the victims and deterring 
future misconduct.251 
The court of appeals, affirming the judgment of the district court, 
reiterated its policy justifications.252 The court of appeals stated that 
society has an interest in protecting public health, and allowing a 
potentially deteriorating medical condition to go undiagnosed violates 
this interest.253 The court further stated that society also has an in-
terest in the development of scientific data and diagnostic examina-
tions produce such data.254 Lastly, the defendant has an interest in 
minimizing overall damages and the early diagnosis and treatment of 
an injury diminishes future damages.255 The common law adaptation 
of the avoidable consequences rule and the allowance of medical ex-
pense damages doctrine provide the legal foundation of the medical 
monitoring claim.256 
"discernible on the occasion when he was drenched with the toxic chemical"); Askey v. Occiden-
tal Chemical Corp., 102 A.D. 130, 137 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (Supreme Court of New York held 
that plaintiffs who suffered toxic exposure from leaking landfill, were entitled to recover 
reasonable medical expense damages, absent a physical injury). 
249 746 F.2d at 825-26. The children were believed to be suffering from a neurological devel-
opment disorder, classified as Minimal Brain Disorder (MBD). [d. at 819. 
250 See id. at 825. The court illustrated its reasoning with the following example: 
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike when Smith is driving through a light. Jones 
lands on his head with some force. Understandably shaken, Jones enters a hospital 
where doctors recommend that he undergo a battery of tests to determine whether he 
has suffered any internal head injuries. The tests proved negative but Jones sues Smith 
solely for what turns out to be the substantial cost of the diagnostic examinations. 
From the example it is clear that even in the absence of physical injury Jones ought 
to be able to recover the cost of various diagnostic examinations proximately caused 
by Smith's negligent action. 
[d. The court stated that clearly Jones ought to recover the costs of the diagnostic tests whim 
were caused by Smith's negligence. [d. 
251 See id. at 824-25. 
252 See id. at 823. 
253 See id. The court made a finding of fact, that without the medical expense damages, a 
significant portion of the children would not receive medical diagnostic testing. [d. at 822-23. 
254 [d. at 823. 
255 [d. 
256 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 678; Slagel, supra note 8, at 863. Every court that recognized 
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2. Medical Principles Underlying Medical Monitoring Damages 
Medical monitoring damages originate from the well-established 
and documented medical principle which provides that the early de-
tection, diagnosis, and treatment of an illness reduces the severity of 
the illness.257 In Ayers v. Township of Jackson, one expert testified 
that "the earliest diagnosis of illnesses, ... could lead to improved 
prospects for cure, prolongation of life, relief of pain, and minimization 
of disability."258 This principle is a foundation for medical monitoring 
damages.259 
3. Public Policy Interests Supporting Medical Monitoring Damages 
Numerous violations of public policy precipitated the courts' recog-
nition of medical monitoring damages.260 The fundamental purposes of 
tort law-compensation and deterrence-were frustrated by the ap-
plication of traditional tort doctrines to the field of toxic torts.261 Even 
after the incremental adaptations262 and the recognition of innovative 
damage claims,263 significant barriers to recovery existed for victims 
of toxic exposure.264 Without victim compensation, defendants were 
not liable for their wrongful acts; and without liability, the deterrence 
function of tort law was frustrated.265 The lack of fulfillment of these 
important public policies provided a foundation for the medical moni-
toring damages claim.266 
medical monitoring as an independent cause of action has utilized the principle of "medical 
expense" damages. See Slagel, supra note 8, at 863. 
257 Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987) (Supreme Court of New Jersey 
states that the ''increased risk of future cancer attributable to delay in diagnosis and treatment 
has become so widely accepted by the medical community that the existence of such harm could 
be reasonably inferred from this professional common knowledge."). 
258 Testimony of Dr. Daum, the medical expert in Ayers, 525 A.2d at 304. 
259 See id. at 311 (periodic medical examinations are necessary to facilitate early detection and 
some toxic tort plaintiffs would be deterred by the financial expense). 
260 See Rudlin & Stravitz, supra note 12 (medical monitoring is a response by the courts, to 
the inequities caused by the application of traditional tort doctrine in toxic tort cases). 
261 Slagel, supra note 8, at 849--50; see Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1630. 
262 The incremental adaptations were the adoption of the "discovery rule," the rejection of the 
"single controversy rule," and the adoption of the "weak version" of the "preponderance of the 
evidence" rule. See supra notes 97-107, 115-18, 123-24, 138-39 and accompanying text. 
263 The innovative damage theories recognized were fear of future illness and enhanced risk 
of future disease. See supra notes 185-231 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra notes 204-05, 214-19, 224-31 and accompanying text. 
265 See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 976-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1993); In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB 
Litig. v. Monsanto Co., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991); see 
also Slagel, supra note 8, at 869. 
266 See, e.g., Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311-12. 
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4. Medical Monitoring Damages: An Innovative Damage Theory 
The medical monitoring claim was first recognized as an indepen-
dent cause of action in the field of toxic torts in Ayers v. Township of 
Jackson.267 A class, consisting of 339 residents of the Legler area, 
brought suit against the Township of Jackson.268 The plaintiffs claimed 
that the Township operated its landfill negligently and as a result, 
their water supply was contaminated and they suffered toxic expo-
sure.269 In addition to various other claims,270 the plaintiffs sought 
recovery for future medical monitoring expenses.271 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the post-exposure, 
pre-symptom plaintiffs were entitled to recover the future costs of 
medical surveillance which were "reasonable and necessary."272 The 
court stated that when determining what is "reasonable and neces-
sary," the following factors should be considered: the significance and 
extent of the exposure to the chemicals; the toxicity of the chemicals; 
the seriousness of the potential diseases; the relative increase in the 
chance of the onset of the disease; and the value of early diagnosis.273 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey overruled the appellate division, 
on this issue and unanimously rejected its use of the "reasonable 
probability" standard.274 The higher court stated that such a standard 
267Id. 
268 See id. at 290; Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 680. The facts of Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 
illustrate the mass susceptibility to toxic exposure. John K. McNamara, Jr., Peifect Together: 
Ayers v. Jackson Township and Presymptom Medical Surveillance Awards in Toxic Torts, J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLICY 339, 345 (1989) (stating "the resultant dangers of toxic 
exposure to human health know no boundaries-social, economic, regional, political, or other-
wise.") In 1972, Jackson Township opened the Legler Landfill. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 292. The New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued a permit, which mandated 
guidelines for the operation of the landfill. Id. The Township operated the landfill in violation of 
the guidelines, including the disposal of substances forbidden in the guidelines. See id. In 1978, 
it was discovered that toxic chemicals had leached from the landfill and contaminated the town 
water supply. Id. at 290. At least twelve hazardous substances, as identified by the EPA, were 
known to have contaminated the water supply. Id. at 292. 
269 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 292. The jury determined, in fact, that the actions of the Township 
were "palpably unreasonable." See id. at 291. 
270 The plaintiffs brought actions for the increased risk of future disease and emotional dis-
tress. See id. at 287. For a discussion of the court's holdings on these claims, see supra notes 
219, 225--27 and accompanying text. 
271 Ayers, 525 A.2d at 297. 
272Id. at 312-13. 
273 See id. at 312. 
274 The "reasonable probability" standard requires a quantification of the risk that the plain-
tiffs will develop cancer, and the quantification must indicate a "reasonable probability." Ayers 
v. Township of Jackson, 493 A.2d 1314, 1323 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1985). The appellate division held 
that without a quantification of risk that plaintiff will contract cancer, the claim for medical 
monitoring damages must fail. Id. 
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"unduly impedes the ability of [the] COurtS"275 to accommodate the 
"emerging complexities of industrialized society and the consequent 
implications for human health."276 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reasoned that medical monitor-
ing damages were consistent with well-accepted legal, medical, and 
public policy principles.277 The court reasoned that medical monitoring 
damages facilitate a basic tenet of tort law-when a person suffers 
damage, caused by the conduct of another, the responsible party 
should pay.278 Furthermore, the court reasoned that in the field of toxic 
torts, medical monitoring damages may be the only compensation 
available to exposure victims.279 The court also stated that medical 
monitoring damages serve the public interest in good health and the 
minimization of disease.28o The court argued that they facilitate access 
to medical testing for exposure victims,281 providing for early detec-
tion and diagnosis which reduces the severity of the disease.282 
Beyond the legal and medical justifications, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey was most influenced by the public policy objectives 
served by medical monitoring damages.283 The court indicated that 
medical monitoring damages will improve the compensation function 
of tort law.284 The court reasoned that victims of toxic exposure have 
an increased likelihood of proving causation.285 The court concluded 
that this occurs because medical monitoring claims are brought tem-
porally close to the exposure, making the establishment of the requi-
site cause and effect relationship easier.286 The court further concluded 
that medical monitoring damages will improve the deterrence func-
tion of tort law because chemical manufacturers, distributors, and 
disposers will be held financially accountable for their conduct, which 
will deter future wrongful conduct.287 Lastly, the court reasoned that 
275 Ayers, 525 A.2d at 308. 
276Id. at 298. 
277 See id. at 311-12. 
278 Id. at 311 (citing C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 90 at 323-27 
(1935)). 
279 Id. at 312. 
200 See id. 
281 See id. at 311. The court stated that absent medical monitoring damages, some plaintiffs 
would be deterred from receiving necessary diagnostic medical testing, by the cost. Id. 
282 Id. Dr. Daum, the medical expert, testified that "the earliest diagnosis of illnesses, ... could 
lead to improved prospects for cure, prolongation of life, relief of pain, and minimization of 
disability." Id. at 304. 
283 See id. at 311-12. 
281 See id. 
285 Id. 
286 See id. 
2m Id. (citing William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liability far Toxic Torts: A 
Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 903--04 (1981) (persons who improperly dispose of 
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medical monitoring damages reduce overall damage awards.288 The 
court argued that they facilitate early detection and diagnosis of 
exposure-related diseases which prevents or mitigates the serious-
ness of the disease, thereby reducing overall damages.289 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in Ayers represented 
a new approach to toxic torts, a radical "public policy" approach.290 An 
increasing number of jurisdictions adopted the rationale of the Ayers 
court and allowed recovery of medical monitoring expenses dam-
ages.291 
Some jurisdictions were as innovative as the Ayers court, and also 
recognized a claim for medical monitoring damages, absent a physical 
injury.292 For example, in Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., the 
Supreme Court of Utah held that diagnostic examinations and recur-
ring medical monitoring damages were recoverable, absent a physical 
injury.293 The court required the plaintiffs, who were exposed to as-
toxic chemicals often weigh the cost of proper disposal against the potential cost of tort liability 
and choose the former alternative». 
288Id. at 312. 
289Id. 
290 See McNamara, supra note 268, at 351; Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 678; see Rudlin & 
Stravitz, supra note 12 (described medical monitoring damages as one of the "most radical 
revolutions" in tort law). 
291 See, e.g., Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 977-78 (Utah 1993) (Supreme 
Court of Utah recognized claim for medical monitoring damages); In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB 
Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 849-52 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991) (third circuit 
recognized claim for medical monitoring damages); Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 
330, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (district court recognized medical monitoring claim). See infra notes 
292-304 and accompanying text. 
292 See, e.g., Hansen, 858 P.2d at 972, 977-78 (Supreme Court of Utah held that plaintiffs who 
were exposed to asbestos were eligible to recover medical monitoring damages absent physical 
injury); Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1993) (ninth circuit held medical 
monitoring damages may be awarded absent physical injury, provided plaintiffs prove they 
suffered a significant exposure to a proven toxic substance, the exposure increased their risk 
of contracting disease, making periodic diagnostic examination necessary, and early detection is 
possible and beneficial); Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569, 570, 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 
5th Dist. 1993), review granted, 847 P.2d 574 (1993) (Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
students who drank contaminated water could recover medical monitoring damages without 
evidence of a physical injury, provided they showed a significant exposure to a toxic substance, 
the toxicity of the chemicals, seriousness of potential disease, and the clinical value of early 
detection); Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1477 (D. Colo. 1991) (district court 
recognized medical monitoring claim, absent physical injury, in dicta); In re Paoli Railroad, 916 
F.2d at 852 (third circuit held medical monitoring damages recoverable absent a physical injury); 
Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847, 848-49 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (district court held 
that plaintiffs, whose water supply was contaminated with toxic chemicals, were entitled to 
recover medical monitoring damages, absent physical injury, provided they prove an exposure, 
a potential injury, and the need for early detection and treatment). Commentators similarly 
advocate the acceptance of medical monitoring damages, absent a physical injury. See also 2 
AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 36, at 380-81 (ALI concluded that medical monitoring 
damages are necessary to improve the tort system's treatment of toxic torts). 
293 858 P.2d at 972, 978. 
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bestos, to show an exposure to a toxic substance; caused by defen-
dant's negligence; resulting in an increased risk of a serious disease, 
illness, or injury; and for which early detection tests exist, are 
beneficial, and have been prescribed by a qualified physician.294 The 
court concluded that medical monitoring damages further the basic 
purposes of tort law.295 The court reasoned that they prevent victims 
of toxic exposure from experiencing financial and medical detriment 
as a result of the wrongful conduct of another.296 Furthermore, the 
court reasoned that medical monitoring damages provide compensa-
tion to victims of toxic exposure who are typically barred from recov-
ery.297 The court also concluded that they promote deterrence.298 
Lastly, the court reasoned that medical monitoring damages facilitate 
the early detection and diagnosis of exposure-related diseases.299 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted 
the reasoning of Ayers, in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation 
v. Monsanto Company.300 Thirty-eight persons, who were exposed to 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a toxic substance, sued for medical 
monitoring damages.801 The court held that medical monitoring dam-
ages were recoverable, absent physical injury, provided the evidence 
indicated a toxic exposure; an increased risk of disease; the necessity 
of the medical exams; and the possibility of early detection and treat-
ment.302 As in the Ayers case, the court in In re Paoli reasoned that 
medical monitoring damages facilitate the goals of the tort system303 
by providing compensation for exposure victims; by encouraging 
plaintiffs to diagnose and treat injuries as early as possible; and by 
deterring irresponsible toxic discharges.304 
The success of the medical monitoring claim is limited in many 
jurisdictions by the retention of the traditional physical injury re-
quirement.805 For example, in Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc., the Dis-
294 Id. at 979. 
295 See id. at 976. 
296 See id. (an economically disadvantaged person may not be able to afford diagnostic tests, 




299 Id. at 976--77. 
300 In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litig. v. Monsanto Co., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 11 S. Ct. 1584 (1991). 
301 Id. at 835. 
302 I d. at 852. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
305 Exposure-related diseases generally have a long latency, and toxic tort victims often cannot 
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trict Court for the Southern District of Virginia held that plaintiffs, 
who suffered exposure to toxic PCBs, were not entitled to medical 
monitoring damages, absent a physical injury, and exposure did not 
constitute such an injury.306 The court reasoned that allowing such 
recovery would overburden the court system and potentially deprive 
the next generation of exposure victims adequate recovery.307 
Some courts have minimized this effect, however, by holding that 
any physical injury occurring at, or near, the time of exposure, con-
stitutes a physical injury.30S For example, in Villari v. Terminix Inter-
national, Inc., the District Court for the Eastern District ofPennsyl-
vania held that the plaintiffs' suffering of nausea, dizziness, and general 
malaise one month after exposure was a sufficient physical injury to 
satisfy the medical monitoring requirement.309 The court further 
stated that the physical injury need not be attributable to the poten-
tial exposure-related disease.310 
Medical monitoring damages are hailed as the most successful in-
novative damage theory in the field of toxic torts.3U Commentators 
and courts state that they facilitate the early detection and diagnosis 
of disease by providing victims of toxic exposure the financial re-
sources to undergo periodic medical examinations.312 Commentators 
and courts conclude that medical monitoring damages reincorporate 
establish an immediate physical injury. See Kristen Chapin, 1bxic Torts, Public Health Data, 
and the Evolving Common Law: Compensation for Increased Risk of Future Injury, 13 J. 
ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 129, 134 (1993); Slagel, supra note 8, at 859. See, e.g., 
Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1372 (S.D. W.Va. 1990), affd without op. sub nom. Ball 
v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 940 F.2d 561, reported in full, 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1992); Potter v. 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1990), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1993) (Sixth District Court of Appeals held that the 
award of medical monitoring damages without a physical injury was the creation of a new cause 
of action and it was "unwilling to create a new cause of action."). 
306 See, e.g., 755 F. Supp. at 1372-73. 
307 See id. at 1372. 
308 See, e.g., Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 330, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (district court 
held that physical injury required to recover medical monitoring damages, but injury need not 
presently exist); Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 317, modified on other 
grounds, 797 F2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) (fifth circuit allowed plaintiff, who was drenched in a toxic 
substance, to recover past and future medical expenses, reasoning that the plaintiffs suffering 
from dizziness, leg cramps, and a persistent stinging sensation in feet and fingers, immediately 
after the exposure, constituted a physical injury). 
309 677 F. Supp. at 332, 338. 
310 See id. 
311 Slagel, supra note 8, at 858. 
312 See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 976-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1993); In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB 
Litig. v. Monsanto Co., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991); see 
also Slagel, supra note 8, at 858. 
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compensation and deterrence into tort law.3l3 Defendants who are held 
liable for their wrongdoing are more likely to be deterred from per-
petrating future wrongful conduct.3l4 Lastly, commentators and courts 
reason that medical monitoring damages provide the opportunity to 
gather essential scientific data on toxic exposure and its effects on 
humans.3l5 
While medical monitoring damages provide recovery to victims of 
toxic torts, they do not eradicate all the barriers to recovery resulting 
from the application of traditional tort principles to the field of toxic 
torts. For example, medical monitoring damages do not provide the 
requisite scientific data to satisfy the "more likely than not" or even 
the "reasonable probability" standard, necessary to prove causa-
tion.3l6 Therefore, tort law must continue to evolve to accommodate 
toxic torts. 
D. The Public Health Fund 
Another innovative damage theory in the field of toxic torts, which 
has been considered by the courts and awarded in private settle-
ments, is the "public health fund."3l7 A fund is an "asset or group of 
assets set aside for a specific purpose."3l8 A "public health fund" is a 
fund that studies, develops, and distributes scientific data on the 
313 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 211; Hansen, 858 P.2d 970 at 976-77; In re Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852. 
See also Slagel, supra note 8, at 869. See supra notes 277-89, 292-99, 300-304 and accompanying 
text. 
314 See, e.g., Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311-12; Hansen, 858 P.2d at 976; In re Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852. 
315 See Gara, supra note 3, at 270-71 (periodic testing may facilitate the gathering of scientific 
data on the health consequences of exposure to particular toxic substances). Once information 
is gathered it becomes a "public good:" it becomes available to any and all persons. See Lyndon, 
supra note 5, at 1809. 
316 For a discussion of the standards of causation, see supra notes 120-24 and accompanying 
text. 
317 A public health fund is also known as a scientific fund. See Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 
778 F. Supp. 512, 514 (D. Colo. 1991). Several jurisdictions have considered awarding a public 
health fund as an extension of medical monitoring damages. See, e.g., Barth v. Firestone Tire 
and Rubber Co., 673 F. Supp. 1466, 1476, 1478 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (district court recognized 
plaintiffs claim for the creation of a fund which would gather and distribute scientific evidence 
on exposure-related diseases); Cook, 778 F. Supp. at 514-15 (district court recognized claim for 
creation of fund, designed to gather and distribute scientific data on the health of exposed 
plaintiffs). Public health funds have been successfully utilized in private settlements of mass 
exposure cases. See, e.g., In re Three Mile Island Litig., 557 F. Supp. 96, 97 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (five 
million dollar public health fund established to finance scientific studies on long term health 
effects of toxic exposure); In re Fernald Litig., No. C-1-85-148, 1989 WL 267039, at *2 (S.D. 
Ohio, Sept. 29, 1989); Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, n.255 (1993) 
(citing In re Heptachlor Litig., Civ. Nos. 76335, 76338, Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Approval of Disbursements (Mar. 31, 1988)). 
318 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at 464. 
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effect of toxic exposure on humans.319 Public health funds are an 
extension of two innovative damage theories: medical monitoring dam-
ages and its adaptation, medical monitoring funds.320 
Medical monitoring damages facilitate the early detection and diag-
nosis of disease.321 The courts recognizing medical monitoring dam-
ages reason that the public has an interest in good health, and the 
avoidance or minimization of disease and periodic medical examina-
tions further that interest.322 One court recognized that the develop-
ment of scientific data also furthers this important interest.323 In 
Friends for All Children, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia reasoned that the public has an interest in protecting public 
health and, in furtherance of such an interest, in the development of 
scientific data.324 
The reasoning of the court in Friends for All Children, illustrates 
the natural progression of expanding the medical monitoring claim to 
include public health funds.325 Public health funds finance the collec-
319 The term ''public health fund" is a generic term and includes various different types of 
funds. One common denominator is that public health funds are typically used in mass exposure 
cases. See, e.g., Cook, 778 F. Supp. at 514-15 (plaintiffs sought public health fund that gathered 
and distributed scientific data on exposed class); Barth, 673 F. Supp. at 1467-68, 1476 (public 
health fund was a fund to develop general scientific data on diagnosis and diseases related to 
benzene exposure); In re Three Mile Island, 557 F. Supp. at 97 (public health fund designed to 
"finance studies of the long term health effects of the TMI incident," including specific and 
general health studies). 
320 See, e.g., Cook, 778 F. Supp. at 515 (district court stated that public health fund is comple-
ment and consistent with public policy principles of medical monitoring damages); Barth, 673 F. 
Supp. at 1478 (district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that claim for medical 
monitoring fund, which included gathering and distributing scientific data, was recoverable in 
equity). 
321 See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 663; Slagel, supra note 8, at 850. See supra notes 280--82 
and accompanying text. 
322 See, e.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987) (Supreme Court of 
New Jersey reasoned that medical monitoring damages were consistent with public health 
interests because they facilitate the early detection and diagnosis of exposure-related diseases); 
Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 976--78 (Utah 1993) (Supreme Court of Utah 
reasoned that medical monitoring damages facilitate the early detection and diagnosis of expo-
sure-related diseases); In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litig. v. Monsanto Co., 916 F.2d 829, 852 
(3d Cir. 1990), eert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991) (third circuit reasoned that medical monitoring 
damages facilitate the early detection and diagnosis of disease). The early detection and diag-
nosis of exposure related diseases enhances the prospect for cure and/or prolonged life. Ayers, 
525 A.2d at 304 (Dr. Daum, the medical expert testified that "the earliest diagnosis of illnesses 
... could lead to improved prospects for cure, prolongation of life, relief of pain, and minimization 
of disability."); Slagel, supra note 8, at 850. 
323 Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
324 Id. at 823. In actuality, the Court of Appeals reiterated the reasoning of the district court. 
Id. 
325 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 702 (quoting 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., ENTERPRISE RESPON-
SIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 379 (1991) ("a socially beneficial role for medical monitoring is 
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tion, development, and distribution of scientific data on the effects of 
toxic exposure on humans.326 Such data furthers the important public 
health interest of avoiding and minimizing disease.327 
One jurisdiction has recognized this natural progression.328 In Cook 
v. Rockwell International Corp., the plaintiffs, who suffered exposure 
to hazardous substances, sought a fund for scientific studies,329 in 
addition to medical monitoring damages.330 The District Court for the 
District of Colorado held that a claim for a scientific fund, which 
assembled and disseminated data from the medical examinations of 
the exposed class, was cognizable.331 The court stated that "pooling 
the examination results is a reasonable complement to normal diag-
nostic testing that furthers the objective behind the [medical moni-
toring cause of action]-to assure the early diagnosis of a latent 
disease."332 
An adaptation of medical monitoring damages, the medical moni-
toring fund, provides an additional foundation for public health 
funds.333 Medical monitoring damages are generally awarded in two 
ways-the traditional lump sum payment and a medical monitoring 
fund.334 A lump sum payment awards the plaintiff all past, present, 
and future recovery in one lump sum payment at the conclusion of the 
to finance serious scientific study of the potential impact of health hazards on exposed groups.")); 
see also Gara, supra note 3, at 270-71 (periodic testing produces essential data on the health 
consequences of exposure-related diseases). 
326 The elimination of scientific uncertainty regarding the effects of toxic chemicals on humans 
is accomplished by gathering data from exposed human populations, comparing it to the unex-
posed populations, and estimating the health risks to the broader population. Lyndon, supra 
note 5, at 1802. 
327 See Friends for All Children, 746 F.2d at 823; Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 778 F. Supp. 
512,515 (D. Colo. 1991) (combining examination results furthers the public health objective of 
early detection and diagnosis of disease); Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 673 F. SUpp. 
1466, 1478 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (without scientific fund plaintiffs were subject to misdiagnosis and 
mistreatment). 
328 Cook, 778 F. Supp. at 515. 
829 [d. at 514-15. 
300 See Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. SUpp. 1468, 1477 (D. Colo. 1991). 
331 See Cook, 778 F. Supp. at 515. The district court clearly differentiated the type of fund 
sought by plaintiffs, which was cognizable, from a "generalized popUlation based scientific 
stud[y ]," which would not be recoverable, in a medical monitoring cause of action. [d. at 514-15. 
The same court, in an earlier decision, did not recognize the recovery of a general scientific fund 
as a valid cause of action. See Cook, 755 F. SUpp. at 1478. 
332 Cook, 778 F. Supp. at 515. 
333 E.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 314 (N.J. 1987) (Supreme Court of New 
Jersey advocates use of medical monitoring fund to disperse medical monitoring damages); 
Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 673 F. Supp. 1466, 1476 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (medical 
monitoring fund adapted to include gathering and distributing information function). 
334 Cook, 778 F. SUpp. at 515; see Ayers, 525 A.2d at 314. 
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litigation.335 The majority of courts employ this method which com-
ports with the traditional tort doctrine, the "single recovery rule."336 
Some courts, in response to the unique characteristics of toxic torts, 
have advocated and/or recognized a novel alternative to the lump sum 
damage award-the medical monitoring fund.337 A medical monitoring 
fund is a supervised fund, typically utilized in mass exposure cases.338 
It disperses medical monitoring damages to plaintiffs on a periodic 
basis.339 Medical monitoring funds centralize all known victims of a 
toxic exposure by associating them with a common entity.340 This 
centrality facilitates the collection and distribution of data.341 
It was a natural progression to adapt medical monitoring funds to 
include a formalized public health fund component.342-Public health 
funds go a step beyond the medical monitoring fund. They assimilate 
335 Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 683; Poston, supra note 9, at 16l. 
336 The "single recovery rule," also known as the "single controversy rule," requires a party 
to recover all past, present, and future damages, against an adversary, in one cause of action. 
See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
337 E.g., Ayers, 525 A.2d at 314 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, although refusing to overturn 
the jury awarded lump sum damages, advocated the creation of a court-supervised medical 
monitoring fund); In re Agent Orange Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396, 1402-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(district court stated that traditional lump sum disbursements were impossible in toxic exposure 
cases because of a "virtual absence of proof of causation [and] financially impractible because of 
[the] administrative costs .... "; see also Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 702 & n.227. Commen-
tators and courts advocating these funds reason that they are the most equitable method of 
compensation in toxic tort cases. E.g., Ayers, 525 A.2d at 313; see Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 
702. The Supreme Court of New Jersey stated "[t]he indeterminate nature of damage claims in 
toxic tort litigation suggests that the use of court-supervised funds to pay medical-surveillance 
claims as they accrue, rather than lump-sum verdicts, may provide a more efficient mechanism 
for compensating plaintiffs." Ayers, 525 A.2d at 313. The court reasoned that such funds offset 
the defendant's liability by allowing payments from collateral sources and by limiting liability 
to the amount of expenses actually incurred. Further, the fund serves the public health interest 
by encouraging regular medical examinations and public interest by reducing insurance in-
creases. Id. at 314. See also Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 693 (periodic payments reduce 
windfalls to toxic tort plaintiffs by limiting recovery to actual expenses). 
338 E.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 818 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (medical monitoring damages sought for class of 149 Vietnamese orphans); In re Three 
Mile Island Litig., 557 F. Supp. 96, 96 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (medical monitoring fund sought for 
thousands of residents living within twenty-five miles of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant); 
Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 702 n.227 (citing In re Fernald Litig., No. C-Ol-85-0l49 (S.D. 
Ohio 1985) (medical monitoring fund sought for estimated 30,000 person class». 
339 Typically a medical monitoring fund awards a lump sum payment to the plaintiff at the 
conclusion of the litigation for all medical expenses already incurred and then either reimburses 
the plaintiff periodically for all future authorized medical expenses or performs the authorized 
medical monitoring examinations. See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 687-88. For a more exten-
sive discussion of the variations of medical monitoring funds, see id. at 687-91. 
340 See Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 702. 
34! See id. The pooling of data is impractical in lump sum awards due to the lack of diaguostic 
uniformity of examinations and the lack of centrality of subjects. Id. 
342 See, e.g., Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 673 F. Supp. 1466, 1478 (N .D. Cal. 1987). 
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the collected data, develop scientific data on the effects of toxic expo-
sure on humans, and disseminate that useful information.343 
One jurisdiction has considered this natural progression.344 In Barth 
v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., the plaintiff,345 who was exposed to 
benzene, heavy metal compounds, and industrial toxins, brought a 
claim in equity seeking the creation of a public health fund.346 The 
public health fund sought by the plaintiff was to "gather and forward 
to treating physicians information relating to the diagnosis and treat-
ment of [the] diseases" potentially caused by the toxic exposure.347 
The District Court for the Northern District of California denied the 
defendant's motion to dismiss,348 holding that the plaintiff satisfied the 
requisite elements of a claim in equity and was therefore, entitled to 
maintain his claim for the creation of a public health fund. 349 
The court stated that the requisite elements of a claim in equity 
are: (i) the plaintiff has no available remedy at law; (ii) the plaintiff 
will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted; and 
(iii) the plaintiff has exhausted all legal remedies.350 The court rea-
soned that the plaintiff had no legal remedy, nor was there a legal 
remedy supporting the creation of a public health fund. 351 The court 
further reasoned that without the creation of such a fund, the plaintiff 
was subject to the misdiagnosis and treatment of exposure-related 
diseases and susceptible to re-exposure to the same harmful toxins.352 
The court stated that "[p ]ostponing or foregoing action that, if taken 
now, might result in the saving of human life would constitute irrepa-
rable harm."353 Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff could 
maintain his claim in equity.354 The guiding principle of the court was 
the adaptability of tort law: "the greatest lesson that we can draw 
343 See supra note 319 and accompanying text. 
344 See Barth, 673 F. Supp. at 1476-78. 
345 A single plaintiff brought this action on behalf of an unidentified class of persons. ld. at 
1468. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant exposed all of its manufacturing employees, over 
5,000 persons, to toxic substances from 1963 until 1981. ld. 
34!l ld. at 1467--{i8. 
347 ld. at 1476. The fund was also designed to locate the unidentified exposed workers and 
inform them of the exposure. ld. 
348 ld. at 1478. This case was settled on January 13, 1992. The plaintiffs did not receive specific 
medical monitoring or health fund damages. Blumenberg, supra note 7, at 709 n.266. 
349 See Barth, 673 F. Supp. at 1478. 
300 ld. at 1477. 
351 ld. at 1477-78. 
352 ld. at 1478. 
353 ld. 
354 ld. 
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from the common law of torts to apply here is that the system must 
evolve to meet the needs of society."3M 
The most successful utilization of public health funds, to date, has 
been in private settlement actions.356 Public health funds have been 
used to assimilate and disseminate essential scientific information on 
toxic exposure and its effect on humans.357 For example, in In re Three 
Mile Island Litigation, a five-million dollar "Public Health Fund" was 
established to "finance studies on the long term health effects of the 
[Three Mile Island] incident."358 The Public Health Fund was desig-
nated to monitor radiation releases from Three Mile Island (TMI) 
Nuclear Power Plant; fund studies concerning exposure-related 
health risks; fund public education programs of plaintiffs and treating 
physicians concerning the early detection of cancer and exposure-re-
855 See id. at 1469. Influential in the decision of the court was Prosser and Keeton's discussion 
of tort law. Id. 
The administration of the law becomes a process of weighing the interests for which 
the plaintiff demands protection against the defendant's claim to untrammeled freedom 
in the furtherance of defendant's desires, together with the importance of those desires 
themselves. When the interest of the public is thrown into the scales and allowed to 
swing the balance for or against the plaintiff, the result is a form of 'social engineering.' 
A decision maker might deliberately seek to use the law as an instrument to promote 
that 'greatest happiness of the greatest number,' or instead might give greater empha-
sis to protecting certain types of interests of individuals as fundamental entitlement 
central to an integrity of person that the law upholds above all else. This process of 
'balancing [sic] the interests' is by no means peculiar to the law of torts, but it has been 
carried to its greatest lengths and has received its most general conscious recognition 
in this field. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 3 at 16-17 (5th 
ed.I984». 
856 See In re Three Mile Litig., 557 F. Supp. 96, 96-97 (M.D. Pa. 1982) ($5 million public health 
fund was established); THREE MILE ISLAND PUBLIC HEALTH FUND, 1989-1990 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 9 [hereinafter TMI PUBLIC HEALTH FUND] (public health fund has produced and dissemi-
nated important scientific data). See also In re Fernald Litig., No. C-I-85--148, 1989 WL 267039, 
at *2, *10 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 29, 1989) ($73 million fund established for "extensive long-term 
medical monitoring of individuals in class" as well as epidemiological studies of residents ''to 
determine if unusual health effects have been experienced."); Brennan, supra note 317, at n.255 
(citing In re Heptachlor Litig., Civ. Nos. 76335, 76338, Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Approval of Disbursements (Mar. 31, 1988) (public health fund included epidemiological studies, 
designed to identify an increased risk of disease due to an exposure to heptachlor). 
857 See Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1802. 
858 557 F. Supp. at 97. On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island [TMI] nuclear power plant 
accident occurred, emitting toxic radioactive substances into the atmosphere. Three classes of 
persons living within a twenty-five mile radius of the plant sued TMI. Class I consisted of 
business entities suffering economic loss; Class II consisted of all individuals who suffered 
economic harm, such as evacuation expenses, lost wages, and diminished property values; and 
Class III consisted of all persons seeking future medical detection damages. Id. at 97 n.1. Classes 
I and II received $20 million in damages and Class III was the recipients of the $5 million "Public 
Health Fund." Id. 
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lated diseases; and fund general research, including epidemiological 
studies into the effects of low level radiation on human health.359 
The TMI Public Health Fund has studied the effects of radiation 
on humans, developed scientific data, and distributed that data.360 
Since the settlement agreement of September 9, 1981,361 the Public 
Health Fund has undertaken numerous scientific studies, including 
epidemiological studies, on the patterns of childhood and adult cancer 
in radiation exposure victims362 and the effects of radiation and expo-
sure stress on pregnant women.363 
The Public Health Fund distributes its scientific results via its 
Annual Report, independent publications, and industry publica-
tions.364 Annually, the Public Health Fund publishes the progress of 
its research, including any significant scientific discoveries.365 For ex-
ample, in its 1989-90 Annual Report, the Public Health Fund reported 
that "noble gases" were the major radioactive substance released 
from TMI.366 It further reported that a "meteorological dispersion 
model" had been developed which accurately estimates the patterns 
of doses received by the communities surrounding TMI.367 
Numerous independent publications are available through the Pub-
lic Health Fund.368 These address topics such as the increased risk of 
breast cancer from low-level radiation exposure and the carcinogen 
effects of low-level radiation.369 Additionally, the Public Health Fund 
359 Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Three Mile Island Litigation (No. 79-0432). at 
12-14. The Public Health Fund was to be used for any of the following purposes: 
(a) improving the monitoring of radiation releases from TMI. .. ; 
Id. 
(b) funding of studies or analyses relating to the possible health related effects ... 
resulting from the TMI accident ... ; 
(c) funding of public education programs involving the general public residing or 
working within twenty-five miles of TMI or the medical community within or serving 
that region on the subjects of (i) cancer and early detection of cancer generally and the 
health effect of radiation ... ; 
(d) funding the preparation of or the means to implement or assist in implementing a 
comprehensive plan of evacuation or emergency assistance ... ; and 
(e) funding general research into the effects of low level radiation on human health and 
related studies and analyses. 
360 See infm notes 362-74 and accompanying text. 
361 See In re Three Mile Island, 557 F. Supp. at 96. 
362 See TMI PUBLIC HEALTH FUND, supra note 356, at 9-14. 
363 Id. at 15-16. 
364 See infm notes 365-74 and accompanying text. 
365 TMI PUBLIC HEALTH FUND, supra note 356, at 2-6. 
366 Id. at 3. 
367Id. at 3-4. 
368 For a comprehensive list of publications, see id. at 30-31. 
369 Id. 
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distributes significant scientific information through industry publica-
tions.37o For example, the Public Health Fund published the conclu-
sions of one of its epidemiology studies in the American Journal of 
Epidemiology.371 The epidemiological study investigated the effects of 
radiation exposure on 160,000 adults and children living near TMI.372 
While the study found no significant connection between exposure to 
the TMI accident and leukemia, it did identify a positive trend be-
tween routine emissions from TMI and leukemia and other cancers in 
children.373 The study further revealed a statistically significant rela-
tionship between childhood cancer in the TMI area and "outdoor 
background gamma radiation from cosmic and terrestrial sources."374 
While public health funds have not yet been widely recognized by 
the courts, they have been extremely successful in private settle-
ments.375 Public health funds have developed scientific data on the 
effects of toxic exposure on humans and disseminated that informa-
tion to victims of toxic exposure, treating physicians, and other indus-
try professionals such as scientists and epidemiologists.376 
IV. THE PLAINTIFF, THE DEFENDANT, AND SOCIETY: BALANCE 
THE INTERESTS AND RECOGNIZE PUBLIC HEALTH FUNDS 
Public health funds are a novel, innovative damage theory.377 But 
the "mere fact that a claim is novel does not defeat it."378 When courts 
consider a novel claim they "weigh . . . the interests for which the 
plaintiff demands protection against the defendant's claim to untram-
meled freedom in furtherance of defendant's desires ... " in conjunc-
tion with the interests of society.379 Public health funds provide sub-
stantial benefits to society and the victims of toxic exposure and 
37°Id. at 9. 
371 Id. Maureen C. Hatch et a!., Cancer Near the Three Mile Island Nuclear Pant: Radiation 
Emissions, 132 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 397 (1990). 
372Id. at 9. 
373Id. at II. 
374Id. at 12. 
375 See supra notes 356--79 and accompanying text. 
376 See id. 
377 While public health funds have been considered in several courts, no jurisdiction has 
recognized a public health fund as defined by this Comment. See, e.g., Cook v. Rockwell Int'l 
Corp., 778 F. Supp. 512, 514-15 (D. Colo. 1991) (court recognized scientific fund for pooling data 
of exposed plaintiffs not general scientific study); Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 673 
F. Supp. 1466, 1476, 1478 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (claim for equivalent of general public health fund 
survived motion to dismiss but was not decided because case was settled). 
378 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 3 at 18. 
379Id. at 16. 
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minimal detriment to toxic substance manufacturers, distributors, 
and/or disposers. 
A. Societal Interests Benefit from Public Health Funds 
Public health funds facilitate the attainment of several important 
societal interests: the interest in public health and the minimization 
of disease; the interest in the development of scientific data; and the 
interest in the deterrence of future toxic exposure.380 It is well-estab-
lished that society has an interest in the preservation of public health 
and the minimization of disease.381 Early detection and diagnosis of 
disease protects this important societal interest.382 But in the field of 
toxic torts essential scientific data concerning the causes and symp-
toms of exposure-related diseases is inconclusive or non-existent.383 
Without such data, early detection and diagnosis is difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve. 
Public health funds promote society's interest in the minimization 
of disease by developing and distributing essential scientific data, 
which facilitates the early detection of disease.384 Public health funds 
examine populations of exposed persons;385 develop essential knowl-
edge, such as what diseases are likely to develop and the early symp-
toms of those diseases;386 and distribute the knowledge to the victims 
of exposure and their treating physicians.387 This was illustrated by 
the TMI Public Health Fund.388 The development and distribution of 
this scientific knowledge will assist in the early detection and diagno-
sis of leukemia in children, in the TMI community and in all other 
children exposed to "noble gas" radiation. This function of public 
health funds facilitates the societal interest in the maintenance of 
health and the minimization of disease. 
Society has an interest in the development and dissemination of 
scientific data on the effects of toxic exposure on humans.389 One 
commentator explained, "[the] improved production and dis semina-
300 See infra notes 381-414 and accompanying text. 
381 See supra notes 277-82 and accompanying text. 
382 See supra notes 277-82, 304 and accompanying text. 
3&! See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text. 
384 It is well-documented principle in the medical profession that the "earliest diagnosis of 
illness ... could lead to improved prospects for cure, prolongation of life, relief of pain, and 
minimization of disability." Ayers V. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 304 (N.J. 1987). 
385 See supra note 319 and accompanying text. 
386 See id. 
387 See id. 
388 See supra notes 358-78 and accompanying text. 
389 The public has a significant interest in the development of data. 
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tion of toxicological data would go far to alleviate [scientific uncer-
tainty]."390 Presently, in the field of toxic torts, such data is inconclu-
sive or non-existent.391 Without scientific data, society is virtually 
incapable of protecting itself against the life-threatening effects of 
toxic exposure.392 
The fundamental purpose of public health funds is to develop and 
distribute scientific data, including epidemiological studies, which are 
considered the "best" evidence.3OO Public health funds are capable of 
fulfilling their purpose. For example, the TMI Public Health Fund 
conducted epidemiological studies on the effects of low-level radiation 
on children; developed scientific data; and disseminated their re-
sults.394 Public health funds advance this important societal interest. 
Society has a tremendous interest in the deterrence of future toxic 
exposures because toxic chemicals are a threat to every member of 
our society. They exist in every home396 and are virtually untested 
concerning their effects of humans.396 They are improperly disposed 
of and frequently and suddenly released.397 Exposure to them causes 
cancer and other equally insidious diseases which are life-threaten-
ing.398 This pervasiveness of toxic chemicals and the severity of expo-
sure-related diseases illustrates the magnitude of society's deterrence 
interest. 
Tort law advocates that liability deters future wrongful conduct.399 
The unique nature of toxic torts created virtually insurmountable 
barriers to recovery.400 These barriers hinder the deterrence function 
of tort law.401 In response to these barriers the courts implemented 
incremental adaptations, such as the adoption of the "discovery 
rule,"402 the rejection of the "single controversy rule,"403 and the adop-
tion of a "weak version" of the "preponderance of the evidence rule."404 
Additionally, the courts have recognized numerous innovative dam-
390 Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1797. 
391 See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text. 
392 See id. 
393 See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. 
394 See supra note 359 and accompanying text. 
395 See supra notes 31-.34 and accompanying text. 
396 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
397 See supra notes 39~2. 
398 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
399 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 4 at 25. 
400 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
401 See supra notes 168--70 and accompanying text. 
402 See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text. 
403 See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text. 
404 See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. 
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age theories-fear of future disease,405 enhanced risk of future ill-
ness,406 and medical monitoring damages.407 While these adaptations 
have provided some recovery to victims of toxic exposure they have 
not sufficiently eradicated all barriers to recovery in toxic torts. 
Public health funds would reincorporate the deterrence function 
into tort law. The recognition of public health funds would alert manu-
facturers, distributors, and disposers of toxic chemicals that they are 
liable for wrongful conduct.408 They would know that they are going 
to be held liable for the expense of developing conclusive scientific 
data on toxic substances and their effect on humans. While this liability 
would undoubtedly deter wrongful conduct, it might also facilitate some 
responsible conduct. Toxic substance manufacturers may implement more 
extensive pre-production testing to identify potentially hazardous sub-
stances. Also manufacturers, distributors, and disposers may limit their 
use of untested products in an attempt to avoid the known commodity 
of public health fund liability. For these reasons, public health funds 
facilitate the important deterrence function of tort law. 
Public health funds also provide the ultimate deterrence function-
the removal of life-threatening toxic chemicals from society. Public 
health funds help to determine the excess risk of disease caused by a 
toxic chemical.409 When scientific data is developed, indicating that a 
toxic substance is highly dangerous, that chemical should be removed 
from society.41o Without the data produced by public health funds, that 
same dangerous substance might remain in mainstream society and 
continue to threaten us all. 
B. Toxic Exposure Victims Benefit from Public Health Funds 
Public health funds provide significant benefits to victims of toxic 
exposure. They facilitate the early detection and diagnosis of expo-
405 See supra notes 189-205 and accompanying text. 
406 The success of the fear of future illness and enhanced risk of future illness claims were 
severely limited by the adherence to physical injury requirements and the "reasonable medical 
certainty" standard. See supra notes 204-05, 214-19 and accompanying text. 
407 Medical monitoring damages provided the greatest recovery to victims of toxic exposure. 
While this was a revolutionary adaptation, its scope is limited. Medical monitoring damages 
provide compensation for periodic medical examinations, they do not ease the barriers of 
recovery for plaintiffs who develop an exposure-related disease and seek damages. See supra 
notes 305-07, 316 and accompanying text. 
400 See supra notes 168-69, 287, 298, 304 and accompanying text. 
409 See supra note 358 and accompanying text. 
410 This statement is premised on belief that governmental regulations would ban or sig-
nificantly regulate the use of toxic chemicals that were deemed to be highly dangerous to 
humans. The validity of this premise is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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sure-related disease411 and significantly reduce the barriers to recov-
ery that have plagued victims of toxic exposure since the inception of 
toxic tortS.412 
Public health funds benefit victims of toxic exposure by facilitating 
the early detection and diagnosis of disease, thereby minimizing the 
severity of the resulting injury. Exposure-related diseases, such as 
cancer, can be life-threatening.413 It is well-documented that the early 
diagnosis and treatment of exposure-related diseases is the best 
method for prolonging life and minimizing disability.414 Without sub-
stantive scientific data on the causes and symptoms of exposure-re-
lated diseases, victims of toxic exposure are prey to misdiagnosis and 
mistreatment, each of which is potentially fatal.415 
Public health funds examine populations of exposed persons;416 de-
velop essential knowledge, such as what diseases are likely to develop 
and the early symptoms of those diseases;417 and distribute the knowl-
edge to the victims of exposure and their treating physicians.418 This 
knowledge improves the potential for early detection, diagnosis, and 
treatment of exposure-related diseases and may literally be the dif-
ference between life and death.419 No greater interest exists than that 
of the toxic exposure victim. Public health funds further this interest. 
Public health funds reduce the barriers to recovery, which have 
plagued victims of toxic exposure. Tort law's basic tenet provides that 
plaintiffs should be compensated when they are wrongfully injured 
by the conduct of others.420 The long latency and scientific uncertainty 
of exposure-related diseases made it virtually impossible for toxic tort 
victims to recover under traditional tort doctrine.421 While the courts 
have implemented incremental adaptations of tort law422 and recog-
nized innovative damage theories,423 these adaptations have not 
sufficiently eradicated these barriers. 
411 See infra notes 413-19 and accompanying text. 
412 See infra notes 420-32 and accompanying text. 
413 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
414 See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text. 
415 See id. 
416 See supra notes 319, 326, 372-74 and accompanying text. 
417 See id. 
418 See supra notes 326, 364--74 and accompanying text. 
419 See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text. 
420 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
421 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
422 See supra notes 97-107, 115--18,124 and accompanying text. 
423 See supra notes 189-205,206-27,232-37,267-304 and accompanying text. 
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The most significant barrier remaining is the burden of proving 
causation.424 Whether a jurisdiction adopted the "more likely than not" 
standard or the "reasonable probability" standard,425 the absence of 
conclusive scientific data has virtually ensured that the toxic tort 
plaintiff cannot satisfy either standard.426 Public health funds will 
facilitate the development of conclusive scientific data capable of sat-
isfying even the higher "more likely than not" standard. Further, by 
disseminating crucial scientific information, sharing results with other 
epidemiologists, and coordinating research;427 public health funds will 
assist in the development of "public" scientific data428 and nationwide 
databases of information.429 This development and dissemination of 
scientific data, accomplished by public health funds, will assist victims 
of toxic exposure in satisfying their burden of causation, thereby 
eradicating a major barrier to recovery. 
Public health funds eradicate numerous practical barriers to recov-
ery for victims of toxic exposure. Previously the low probability of 
recovery discouraged victims of exposure from bringing actions or 
encouraged premature settlement.430 Public health funds improve the 
opportunity for recovery, thereby eradicating this barrier. Addition-
ally, victims of toxic exposure are often discouraged or precluded from 
bringing an action due to the inordinate expense of the requisite 
scientific data and expert testimony.431 Public health funds provide 
scientific data for the "public good;" data that is made available to 
everyone.432 The increased availability of scientific data will eradicate 
this barrier to recovery.433 
c. Defendant's Detriment from Public Health Funds is Minimal 
When considering the interests of the defendant, one must consider 
"the defendant's claim to untrammeled freedom in the furtherance of 
defendant's desires, together with the importance of those desires 
421 See supra notes 120-143 and accompanying text. 
425 See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text. 
426 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
427 This role of public health funds was illustrated in the TMI Public Health Fund. When the 
Fund discovered the link between noble gases and leukemia, it considered the coordination of 
research with studies in Britain. See supra notes 366-67 and accompanying text. 
428 "Public" data is that which is available to all. See Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1809. 
429 See supra notes 76, 360 and accompanying text. 
400 See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text. 
431 This barrier is exacerbated by fact that economically disadvantaged are most often victims 
of turic exposure. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
432 Scientific data which is a "public good" is a "good whose consumption by one user does not 
diminish its availability or benefit to any other user." Lyndon, supra note 5, at 1809. 
433 Once data is developed it is easily transferable at a low marginal cost. See id. 
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themselves."434 The defendant has an interest in the maximization of 
financial profits. However, this is not an unfettered interest.435 Since, 
this interest is not a protected interest, additional factors must be 
considered when assessing the overall detriment to the defendant.436 
Manufacturers, distributors, and disposers of toxic substances reap 
tremendous benefits from their use of toxic substances and the rec-
ognition of public health funds will not substantially reduce these 
benefits. It is estimated that the development of scientific data on a 
toxic substance costs "up to one million dollars."437 While this figure 
appears large, it is minimal in comparison to the overall profits of 
chemical companies.438 This financial detriment is further diminished 
when the scope of public health funds is considered. Public health 
funds are best utilized in mass exposure cases which, while too fre-
quent, are not a common occurrence. For these reasons, public health 
funds will not substantially reduce defendant's economic profits. 
Manufacturers and distributors of toxic substances are allowed to 
utilize and profit from toxic substances without knowing their effect, 
harmful or otherwise, on humans. In fact, they are virtually insulated 
from mandatory testing by medical ethics considerations,439 lack of 
governmental regulations,44o and the long latency of exposure-related 
diseases.441 Public health funds require the defendant to finance scien-
tific testing that should have occurred in the early stages of the 
development and production of toxic substances. Since public health 
funds merely require something that should have already occurred, 
the defendant's detriment is minimal. 
Lastly, a basic tenet of tort law is that between an innocent victim 
and a wrongdoer, the wrongdoer should bear the expense of its ac-
tions.442 It is most equitable for the defendant and not the innocent 
toxic exposure victim to bear the cost of the collection, development, 
and dissemination of scientific data. For these reasons, the overall 
434 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 3 at 16--17. 
435 The Supreme Court has "consistently ... upheld regulations imposed to arrest a significant 
threat to the common welfare, whatever their economic effect on the owner." Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2905 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1992) (citing Goldblatt 
v. Hemstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962); Gorieb v. Fox Realty Co., 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927); 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887». 
436 See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 3 at 16-17. 
437 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
438 In 1975 the after-tax profits of the chemical industry were $5.5 billion. Lyndon, supra note 
5, at 1797 n.66 (citing S. EpSTEIN, POLITICS OF CANCER 72-73 (1978». 
439 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
440 See Lyndon, supra note 5. 
441 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
442 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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detriment to defendants imposed by the recognition of public health 
funds is minimal. 
D. Balance The Interests And Recognize Public Health Funds 
Public health funds significantly benefit the interests of society and 
the victims of toxic exposure. While they diminish the potential 
profits of the manufacturers, distributors, and disposers of toxic sub-
stances, the overall detriment is minimal. When these competing 
interests are balanced, the result must be in favor of "the greatest 
happiness [and health] of the greatest number."443 The obvious result 
is the recognition of public health funds. This is the only equitable 
outcome for society. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The massive commonplace use of untested toxic chemicals, the 
improper disposal of such chemicals, and the sudden uncontrolled 
release of them has caused a proliferation of toxic exposure victims. 
The unique nature of toxic torts-the long latency and scientific un-
certainty of cancer and exposure-related diseases-created virtually 
insurmountable barriers to recovery for toxic tort victims. In the 
absence oflegislative recovery, the courts have incrementally adapted 
tort law and recognized innovative damage theories in an attempt to 
eradicate these barriers. While some victims of toxic exposure are 
compensated within the tort system, particularly by the innovative 
damage theory of medical monitoring damages, significant barriers to 
recovery remain. 
Public health funds are the essential next step in the evolution of 
tort law to accommodate toxic torts. Public health funds provide 
tremendous benefits to society, including the protection of the public 
health and the minimization of disease. Public health funds also sig-
nificantly benefit the victims of toxic exposure by facilitating the early 
detection of disease and eradicating the barriers to compensation. In 
light of the significance of these interests, the detriment to the defen-
dant is minimal. The weight of the interests clearly favors recognition 
of the novel claim, public health damages. Whether a public health 
fund is recognized as a component of medical monitoring damages or 
as its own cause of action in equity, public health funds must be 
recognized and fully utilized if our society is to be free of the threat 
of toxic chemicals. 
443 See PROSSER & KEETON, 8UP1.15'lllfJ 3 aUD1~ 
